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OF PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
SCHOOLS
KIMBERLY J. JENKINS*
ABSTRACT

Single-sex public elementary and secondary schools are
making a comeback. School districts are structuring these
schools in a variety of ways, including by providing a single-sex
public school for only one sex or by offering single-sex schools for
both sexes. These disparate structures of single-sex schools
create distinct potential harms, risks, and benefits for students.
This Article contends that the constitutional framework applied
to single-sex schools should be systematically modified to
recognize the different potential harms, risks, and benefits of
these single-sex schools in a manner that will create optimal
conditions for creating single-sex public schools. The proposed
modifications address the shortcomings of other scholarly
proposals and minimize the current indeterminacy in the
constitutional case law that could create unnecessary barriers
to the development of single-sex public schools.
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INTRODUCTION

Public single-sex elementary and secondary schools are experiencing a renaissance that appears likely to continue in the coming
years, given the anticipated increased flexibility in the federal laws
that regulate such schools. 1 The U.S. Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights (OCR) is scheduled to release new regulations
that provide additional flexibility under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 (Title IX)2 for public single-sex schools and
classrooms. 3 The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 permits local
educational agencies to use some funds to support single-sex
schools and classrooms consistent with applicable law. 4 In 1995,
only three public high schools had all-female student bodies. 5 For
1. See Martha Minow, Remarks, Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (And
Single-Sex Education): In Honor of Linda McClain, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 815, 817 (2005)
(noting the 2004 publication of the Office for Civil Rights' proposed changes to federal
regulations that govern single-sex schools and that "by publishing the proposed rule, the
federal government has clearly signaled a green light for experiments"); Denise C. Morgan,
Anti-Subordination Analysis After United States v. Virginia: Evaluating the Constitutionality
ofK-12 Single-Sex Public Schools, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 381,389 ("[I)n recent years there has
been a resurgence of interest in single-sex schooling-particularly on the K-12 level."); Tal
Barak, Number of Single-Sex Schools Growing: N.Y. C. -Based Network Opens Schools for Girls
in Urban Districts, Eouc. WK (Bethesda, Md.), Oct. 20, 2004, at 33 (discussing the recent
growth in single-sex public education and noting that "the interest in single-sex education
stems from a friendlier climate in Washington under the Bush administration"); Jane Gross,
Dividing the Sexes, for the Tough Years: A Coed School Offers Boys and Girls Separate Classes
in Grades 6-8, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at B1 (discussing the proposed amendments to
federal law on single-sex public schools that would encourage development of these schools);
Todd Silberman, Girls Charter School Would Be N.C.'s First; Raleigh Backers Follow National
Trend, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 14, 2004, at A1 (discussing how the number
of single-sex schools and classes could rise significantly because of proposed changes to the
federal law that regulates single-sex public education).
2. Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any program or activity that
receives federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
3. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004) (to be
codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
4. No Child Left Behind Act of2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5131(a}(23), 115 Stat. 1425,
1782 (2001) (to be codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301) (providing that innovative program funds may
be used for "[p)rograms to provide same-gender schools and classrooms (consistent with
applicable law}").
5. See Nat'! Ass'n for Single-Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Public Schools in the United
States, http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter
NASSPE, Schools). The three public single-sex high schools in 1995 were Western High
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the 2005-06 school year, the National Association for Public SingleSex Education (NASSPE) reports that forty-four public elementary
and secondary schools in the United States are single-sex and that
thirteen of these schools opened or became single-sex in the 2005-06
school year. 6 In light of these developments and growing public
demand for single-sex public schools, educators and scholars are
focusing increased attention on this educational option. 7
The emergence of a new generation of public single-sex elementary and secondary schools raises several novel constitutional
questions because some of these schools have unique characteristics
that distinguish them from other types of sex8 classifications,
including the potential for voluntary decisions by students (or their
parents) to be classified based on sex-by attending the school-and
the provision by some schools or districts of similar educational
opportunities to both sexes. When looking for answers to these
constitutional questions, educators and courts will find mixed
signals in the Supreme Court's case law on sex classifications,
including its two single-sex public education cases, both of which
involved postsecondary schools. 9 On the one hand, in United

School in Baltimore, Maryland, Philadelphia High School for Girls, and Spectrum High
Schools for Girls in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. NASSPE defines a single-sex school as a school
"in which all grades offer ONLY single-sex classes" and excludes correctional schools. Id.
6. See id.
7. See Minow, supra note 1, at 830-31 ("With clear encouragement at the federal level
and strong interests in the states, I predict that distinctive educational programs for girls and
single-sex educational settings will be expanding."); Ashley E. Johnson, Note, Single-Sex
Classes in Public Secondary Schools: Maximizing the Value of a Public Education for the
Nation's Students, 57 VAND. L. REv. 629, 665 (2004) ("Increasing public interest in single-sex
schools further reflects their positive reputation."); Alexa Aguilar, School District Finds
Success with Single-Sex Classrooms, ST. LoUIS POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2005, at B1
(discussing the "growing number of public schools nationwide that are moving to single-sex
schools or offering single-sex classes within a coed school").
8. Although many distinctions can be drawn between sex and gender, the terms are used
interchangeably in this Article. See generally Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of
Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1-2
(1995) (discussing the differences between the terms and noting "[s]ex is regarded as a
product of nature, while gender is understood as a function of culture. This disaggregation of
sex from gender represents a central mistake of equality jurisprudence").
9. Additionally, in 1977, the Supreme Court affirmed a Third Circuit opinion that found
two comparable single-sex public high schools constitutional. See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist.
of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an equally divided court per curiam, 430
u.s. 703 (1977).

1958

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1953

States v. Virginia 10 and Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan/ 1 the Court held, respectively, that the single-sex admissions policies at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) and the
Mississippi University for Women (MUW) were unconstitutional
under intermediate scrutiny, which requires a sex classification to
be substantially related to an important governmental interest. 12
The Court held in both cases that the State failed to demonstrate a
substantial relationship between the State's purported objective and
the single-sex admissions policy. 13 On the other hand, Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court in Virginia, went so far as to state
that the Court did "not question the Commonwealth's prerogative
evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities" in
response to arguments from amici that single-sex schools can
increase the variety of educational options. 14
While the Court did not question the State's prerogative to
support diverse educational opportunities in an evenhanded
manner, the rigor with which intermediate scrutiny was applied in
Virginia prompted many to suggest that intermediate scrutiny is
becoming increasingly indistinguishable from strict scrutiny. 15 In
fact, Justice Scalia found the Court's scrutiny to be so exacting that
he proclaimed single-sex education "functionally dead." 16 While
10. 518 u.s. 515 (1996).
11. 458 u.s. 718 (1982).
12. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724.
13. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 536; Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
14. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534 n. 7 (emphasis added). The Court in both Virginia and Hogan
explicitly noted that the facts before it involved a unique single-sex institution that existed
for only one sex, as opposed to similar single-sex institutions for each sex. See id.; Hogan, 458
U.S. at 720 n.l.
15. See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting)("And the rationale oftoday's
decision is sweeping: for sex-based classifications, a redefinition of intermediate scrutiny that
makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny."); Low-Income Women of Tex. v. Bost, 38
S.W.3d 689, 705 (Tex. App. 2000) (Yeakel, J., dissenting) ("The Supreme Court possibly
heightened the federal review standard somewhat in United States v. Virginia .... "), rev'd sub
nom. Bell v. Low Income Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2002); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75
(1996) ("The Court [in Virginia) did not merely restate the intermediate scrutiny test but
pressed it closer to strict scrutiny."). But see David K Bowsher, Note, Cracking the Code of
United States v. Virginia, 48 DUKE L.J. 305, 338 (1998) ("[T]he MESSAGE of United States
v. Virginia is the same as the MESSAGES of the Court's earlier gender-based equal protection
cases: gender classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny.").
16. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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some have agreed with Justice Scalia and have contended that
public single-sex schools are not likely io survive constitutional
scrutiny after Virginia, 17 others have argued that ample room
remains under the Constitution for such schools to exist and even
thrive. 18 Because new single-sex public schools open each year, the
contentious debate continues today over the constitutionality of
single-sex public elementary and secondary schools. 19
Attempting to provide some answers to the constitutional
questions surrounding public single-sex schools, scholars have
principally turned to two theories of gender equity to address how
courts would or should apply intermediate scrutiny to these schools:
formal equality and antisubordination. Formal equality determines
the constitutionality of single-sex schools by examining whether
girls and boys are provided substantially equal opportunities. 20 In
17. See, e.g., ROSEMARY C. SAWMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX
SCHOOUNG 2 (2003) (noting that the National Organization for Women and the New York
Civil Liberties Union "questioned how any publicly supported single-sex school could possibly
survive the Court's recent decision in the VMI case"); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a
Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50
DUKE L.J. 753, 813 (2000) ("While same-sex schooling has not been found per se
unconstitutional, the Court's rulings suggest that it will be difficult indeed for such
educational policies to pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause."); Valorie K Vojdik,
Girls' Schools After VMI: Do They Make the Grade?, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 69, 96
(1997) ("While VMI does not per se prohibit public girls' schools, it is nevertheless doubtful
that New York school officials will be able to demonstrate that public schools for girls serve
an 'exceedingly persuasive justification."').
18. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 1, at 383 ("Nor is there any reason to believe the
'exceedingly persuasive justification' language in Virginia necessarily spells the end of the
new generation of single-sex public schools."); Cass Sunstein notes that
Virginia certainly does not invalidate the state's decision to separate men and
women in the interest of ensuring equal opportunity.... If the state reached its
decision deliberatively and without infection from stereotypes about gender
roles, and the decision promoted rather than undermined equal opportunity, the
Court might uphold the program.
Sunstein, supra note 15, at 76; see also MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POUCY AND THE
LAw 571 (4th ed. 2002) ("Various commentators concluded that the decision sounded the
death knell for single-sex education, but others countered that school districts could provide
such programs so long as they offered a sufficiently compelling justification.").
19. See Minow, supra note 1, at 816 ("The topic of some urgency is single-sex education
in kindergarten through high school, not college-level education."); Morgan, supra note 1, at
458 ("Rather than resolving the quandary, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Virginia left important questions unanswered."); Sunstein, supra note 15, at 76 ("The Court
did not decide a number of future questions about same-sex programs .... ").
20. See infra text accompanying notes 261-65.
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contrast, antisubordination focuses on whether the single-sex
opportunities harm or perpetuate the inferiority of girls and
women. 21 This Article explains why these theories, as currently
formulated, should not be adopted as the sole theoretical guideposts
for applying intermediate scrutiny to single-sex public elementary
and secondary schools.
This Article then proposes a modification and systematization of
intermediate scrutiny that, on balance, will achieve results superior
to the Court's current intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence and
these scholarly approaches. The new generation of single-sex public
schools may benefit some students and create pitfalls for others. 22
The optimal constitutional standard applied to these schools should
allow educators, parents, and schoolchildren to harvest the benefits
while avoiding or minimizing the pitfalls. The new approach
outlined in this Article for assessing the constitutionality of singlesex schools seeks to achieve the appropriate balance between the
potential advantages and disadvantages of single-sex public schools.
It works within the existing intermediate scrutiny framework and
case law when doing so would achieve the best possible results.
However, this Article also proposes that the Court modify and
systematize intermediate scrutiny when the current framework
would result in adverse outcomes or where the Court has yet to
explore the constitutional ramifications of single-sex public schools.
At the heart of this Article's approach is the contention that two
factors determine the nature of the potential harm presented by
single-sex public schools: (1) voluntary attendance at the schools
and (2) the provision of substantially equal single-sex schools for
each sex. Analysis of these two factors results in dividing single-sex
public schools into two categories that present distinct potential
harms: (1) dual, voluntary schools, in which each sex may attend
substantially equal schools, and students attend the schools
voluntarily; or (2) solitary or involuntary schools, in which one sex
is provided with a single-sex school that the other sex is not

21. See infra text accompanying notes 284-86.
22. See Leonard Sax, The Promise and Peril of Single-Sex Public Education: Mr. Chips
Meets Snoop Dogg, Enuc. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Mar. 2, 2005, at 48 (describing the success of
some single-sex schools and the problems encountered by others).
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provided, or in which students attend a single-sex school involuntarily.
Traditionally, to apply intermediate scrutiny to single-sex schools,
a district would have to show that its single-sex admissions policy
serves an important govemmental interest and that the policy is
substantially related to the achievement of that interest. 23 However,
the Court has applied the substantial relationship component of
intermediate scrutiny in an inconsistent manner, sometimes
requiring a very tight fit between means and ends and sometimes
permitting a rather loose fit. 24 The variety of possible interpretations of intermediate scrutiny could have a detrimental impact on
the development of single-sex public schools because courts could
unnecessarily constrain educators' options for developing innovative
single-sex programs, or courts might fail to require adequate
safeguards to protect schoolchildren from the potential adverse
effects of single-sex schools. In addition, the uncertainty in the
constitutional standard could chill the opening of such schools by
educators who fear the risk oflitigation. The proposal in this Article
seeks to avoid these adverse results by systematizing how voluntary
attendance and the provision of substantially equal benefits should
modify the substantial relationship component of intermediate
scrutiny.
The identification of and focus on these two factors for assessing
whether single-sex schools have a substantial relationship to their
important objective mirrors the Court's systematization of strict
scrutiny in United States v. Paradise, in which the Court identified
the key factors that determine whether a program is narrowly
tailored to achieve its compelling governmental interest. 25 By
applying disparate interpretations of intermediate scrutiny
depending on the potential harms of single-sex schools, this Article's
approach builds on the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger. 26 As discussed briefly below, in Grutter, the Court
modified its past requirements for strict scrutiny so that the
23. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
24. See infra Part II.A-B.
25. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (noting that when the Court
determines if a program is narrowly tailored the Court examines "several factors").
26. 539 u.s. 306 (2003).
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standard recognized the unique characteristics of the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions policy, distinguishing it from
other racial classifications. 27 Similarly, this Article acknowledges
that the distinct characteristics of some single-sex schools neither
present the same potential harm nor should be subject to the same
constitutional hurdles as some of the sex classifications that the
Court has considered in the past.
This Article develops its proposal in five parts. Part LA briefly
examines the causes of the recent resurgence in single-sex public
elementary and secondary schools, including the search for effective
alternatives to address the needs of girls and boys and the proposed
increased flexibility for such schools under Title IX. Part I.B
considers the objectives of single-sex schools and includes a short
overview of the literature regarding the possible benefits of singlesex schools, and Part I.C describes the success of some modem day
single-sex public schools. Part I.C concludes with a recognition that
single-sex schools may present potential harms, as evidenced by
concerns that have arisen in more recent single-sex public schools
and the history of single-sex schools in the United States.
Part II considers the Supreme Court's disparate interpretations
of intermediate scrutiny, explaining how intermediate scrutiny's
indeterminacy renders it ineffective as a constitutional standard for
single-sex schools. Part III presents the two existing theories that
dominate the scholarship on single-sex schools and argues that
these theories alone should not be adopted. Part IV's analysis of
Grutter v. Bollinger sets the stage for this Article's proposal by
analyzing how the Court revised the requirements of the Equal
Protection Clause to address the particular circumstances of the
state action before the Court. Part IV also identifies the two unique
characteristics of some public single-sex schools that support
modification of the existing constitutional framework. Part IV then
proposes how intermediate scrutiny should be applied to dual,
voluntary single-sex schools and to solitary or involuntary single-sex
schools. Part V presents some concluding thoughts and explains
some of the benefits of adopting this proposal, including a discussion

27. See infra Part IV.A.
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of how the proposal, if adopted, would systematize and clarify
intermediate scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools. 28

I. THE RENAISSANCE OF PuBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOLS

A. Why Single-Sex Public Elementary and Secondary Schools Are
Reemerging in the United States

In the 1990s, educators and researchers began focusing on public
single-sex education as one possible avenue to address gender
equity concerns in coeducational schools, even though single-sex
public schools were virtually extinct in the United States by the late
1980s. 29 Gender bias within coeducational schools was uncovered
and highlighted beginning in the late 1970s, initially focusing on the
bias that girls faced in K-12 coeducational settings. 30 These concerns
included findings that in coeducational schools, particular subjects
became identified with one gender; for example, English and foreign
languages were considered feminine or "girl subjects," while science

28. This Article does not separately address the racial implications of developing singlesex schools, particularly within urban areas. For articles addressing these issues, see, for
example, Kevin D. Brown, The Dilemma ofLegal Discourse for Public Educational Responses
to the "Crisis" Facing African-American Males, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 63 (1994); Verna L.
Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the Construction of Race and
Gender, 2004 WIS. L. REv. 15.
29. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 70-71; Amanda Datnow & Lea Hubbard,Introduction
to GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON SINGLE-SEX AND COEDUCATIONAL
SCHOOLING 3 (Amanda Datnow & Lea Hubbard eds., 2002) [hereinafter GENDER IN POLICY
AND PRACTICE) ("Public schools in at least fifteen U.S. states have recently responded to calls
for the improvement of education more generally, or to gender equity concerns, through
experiments with single-sex education, most often in the form of separate math or science
classes for girls."); Whitney Ransome & Meg Milne Moulton, Why Girls' Schools? The
Difference in Girl-Centered Education, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 589, 589-90 (2001) (discussing
a revived interest in single-sex education in the 1990s); NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5
(listing single-sex public schools within the United States and listing only two such schools
in existence by the late 1980s).
30. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 70-71 (discussing studies on gender bias in the
classroom from the late 1970s and 1980s); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 2-3 (noting
that "many studies over the past twenty-five years have documented gender bias against
females in coeducational classrooms both at the K-12 and higher education levels"); Ransome
& Moulton, supra note 29, at 591 (noting that the "'chilly classroom climates' that permeated
co-educational institutions were almost non-existent in girls' schools" (footnote omitted)).
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and math were seen as masculine or "boy subjects. "31 Research also
indicated that girls did not feel as comfortable speaking in class as
boys did and that they received less attention than boys. 32 In
addition, starting in the middle school years, teachers gave boys
more feedback, and "boys were more confident in learning math and
science and perceived these subjects to be more useful."33 For
example, a 1992 study by the American Association of University
Women (AAUW) entitled How Schools Shortchange Girls revealed
disconcerting findings on girls in coeducational schools, including
the finding that girls "often are not expected or encouraged to
pursue higher-level mathematics and science courses. "34
A 1999 report by the AAUW entitled Gender Gaps: Where Schools
Still Fail Our Children further documented the complexity of
gender equity concerns in the classroom. 35 The report indicated that
the practice of tracking students affects the course-taking patterns
of girls and boys in different ways:
Girls are more likely than boys to have their abilities overlooked
in math and science-a pattern that limits their future opportunities. On the other hand, girls are also more likely than boys to
be identified at a young age for gifted programs. However, girls
fall off this gifted track at a higher rate than boys, particularly
once they reach high school. There, peer pressure tells many
girls to hide their intelligence and be quiet. 36

Others have echoed the AAUW's much-publicized findings on the
negative treatment that girls experience in school. For example,
some have contended that adverse treatment in the classroom
discourages girls from speaking during the class discussions,
adversely affects their self-confidence, and discourages them from
pursuing careers in subjects such as math and science. 37 Two
31. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 71.
32. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 3 ("Females have historically received less
attention than boys [and] feel less comfortable speaking out in class ....").
33. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 71.
34. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, HOW SCHOOL'l SHORTCHANGE GIRLS 147 (1992).
35. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, GENDER GAPS: WHERE SCHOOLS STILL FAIL OUR
CHILDREN 61 (1998).

36. ld. at 30.
37. See Vojdik, supra note 17, at 86; Beth Willinger, Single Gender Education and the
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experts on the disparate treatment of girls in the classroom, David
and Myra Sadker, describe this phenomenon in their book entitled
Failing at Fairness: How America's Schools Cheat Girls, in which
they contend that "[t]eachers interact with males more frequently,
ask them better questions, and give them more precise and helpful
feedback. Over the course of years the uneven distribution of
teacher time, energy, attention, and talent, with boys getting the
lion's share, takes its toll on girls."38 The Sadkers maintain that this
disparate treatment may result not only in the "loss of self-esteem,"
but also in lower achievement and the elimination of professional
options. 39 In addition, research indicates that girls experience more
harassment in schools, including sexual harassment. 40 These and
other factors have led educators and researchers to conclude, within
the past couple of decades, that factors within and outside of schools
negatively influenced the attitudes, achievement, course enrollment,
and career choices of girls in coeducational schools. 41
While concerns about gender equity in schools have often focused
on girls, many have contended more recently that how boys fare is
the real problem, and some have challenged the research on harm
to girls. 42 For example, in her 2000 book entitled The War Against
Boys: How Misguided Feminism Is Harming Our Young Men,
Christina Hoff Sommers explains how boys lag substantially behind
girls in reading and writing, and she contends that "it is boys, not
girls, who are languishing academically" on a variety of measures,
including lower educational aspirations, lower grades, and less

Constitution, 40 LOY. L. REV. 253, 275 (1994) (noting that evidence exists that teachers
discriminate against girls in math and science classes).
38. MYRASADKER& DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: HOW AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT
GIRLS 1 (1994).
39. Id.
40. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 35, at 85 (finding that eighty-five percent
of girls and seventy-six percent of boys had experienced sexual harassment); MICHAEL GURIAN
ET AL., BOYS AND GIRLS LEARN DIFFERENTLY! 55 (2001); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29,
at3.
41. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 71.
42. See GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 63-66; SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 4; Datnow
& Hubbard, supra note 29, at 3; Ann Hulbert, Boy Problems: The Real Gender Crisis in
Education Starts with theY Chromosome, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, (Magazine), at 13, 13-14
(discussing the fact that girls outperform boys in verbal test scores, college enrollment, and
degrees earned).
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rigorous academic programs. 43 Sommers and others have also
challenged the Sadkers' research and some of the AAUW research
as being intentionally biased against boys, having "factual errors,"
and being motivated by a strategy to secure benefits for females. 44
Other research echoes Sommers's concerns about boys, such as
their lower language and reading scores, their higher referral rates
to special education, and their greater likelihood to be involved in
violent crime and drug and alcohol use. 45 For instance, Judith
Kleinfeld contends that girls are generally thriving in education and
boys are the ones experiencing harmful treatment in the classroom
and adverse educational outcomes. 46 A 2005 report by a group of
Duke University researchers examines a number of indicators of
well-being, including educational attainment, material wealth, and
material/spiritual well-being, finding that the well-being of girls
and boys tracked fairly closely, with girls showing advantages in
more indicators than boys. 47 The report concludes that girls are
not disadvantaged in their educational attainment; instead, "[i]f
anything, it is boys who are falling behind, particularly at the
higher levels of education. "48 Others have also noted a recent surge
in studies and research that reveals "greater gender bias ... against
boys" in educational settings. 49
The totality of the research suggests that in recent decades both
sexes have experienced discrimination, undesirable educational
outcomes, and stereotyping in distinct ways. 5°Furthermore, current
43. CHRISTINA HOFF SOMMERS, THE WAR AGAINST BOYS: HOW MISGUIDED FEMINISM Is
HARMING OUR YOUNG MEN 14, 24 (2000).
44. See GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 63-66; JUDITH KLEINFELD, THE MYTH THAT
SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS: SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE SERVICE OF DECEPl'ION 1-2 (1998);
SOMMERS, supra note 43, at 22-23.
45. See Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 3; Hulbert, supra note 42, at 13-14
(discussing the recent focus of educators on the educational problems plaguing boys);
Cornelius Riordan, Gender Gap Trends in Public Secondary Schools: 1972 to 1992, at 2 (Aug.
21, 1998) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological
Association in August 1998).
46. See KLEINFELD, supra note 44, at 3.
47. See Sara 0. Meadows et al., Assessing Gilligan v. Sommers: Gender Specific Trends
in Child and Youth Well-Being in the United States, 1985-2001, 70 Soc. INDICATORS REs. 1,
44 (2005) (noting that the study does not track indicators such as self-esteem).
48. See id. at 44.
49. GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40, at 54 (emphasis omitted).
50. See id. at 54-57 (summarizing research on specific areas in which both girls and boys
experience advantages and disadvantages in education); Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29,
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achievement data reveal a complex picture in which neither sex
consistently outperforms the other. Instead, "[r]ecent reports have
now confirmed that both boys and girls are on the unfavorable side
of the gender gap in education and developmental matters. "51 In
November 2004, the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES) released a report that compiles a "wide range of published
and unpublished statistical materials" on academic outcome
measures disaggregated by sex. 52 The NCES summarizes this data
as revealing that
in elementary and secondary school and in college, females are
now doing as well as or better than males on many indicators of
achievement and educational attainment, and ... large gaps that
once existed between males and females have been eliminated
in most cases and have significantly decreased in other cases. 53

The report provides the most recent comprehensive examination of
instances in which girls outperform boys, instances in which boys
continue to outperform girls, and situations in which performance
outcomes may be similar or may fluctuate depending on grade and
assessment year. For example, boys scored higher than girls on
geography, calculus, and science exams. 54 While both elementary
and secondary school girls and boys use computers to the same
extent, boys constitute eighty-six percent of the students who took
the Advanced Placement computer science exam, and their average
test scores were higher than the average scores for girls. 55 However,
"[a]lthough there is a common perception that males consistently
outperform females in mathematics, [National Assessment of
Education Progress] mathematics scores have not shown this .... In
at 3 ("Gender bias is now seen as affecting both girls and boys, because neither group is
immune to societal pressures and expectations.").
51. Cornelius Riordan, What Do We Know About the Effects of Single-Sex Schools in the
Private Sector?: Implications for Public Schools, in GENDER IN POUCY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 29, at 10, 27; see NANCY S. COLE, EDUC. TESTING SERV., THE ETS GENDER STUDY: How
FEMALES AND MALES PERFORM IN EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS 10 (1997) (discussing studies that
reveal that gender differences in performance cut both ways).
52. See CATHERINE E. FREEMAN, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'r OF EDUC.,
TRENDS IN EDUCATIONAL EQUITY OF GIRLS AND WOMEN: 2004, at 1 (2004).
53. Id.
54. See id. at 6, 32.
55. See id. at 7-8.
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mathematics, the gap between average scale scores has been quite
small and fluctuated only slightly between 1990 and 2003."56 The
disparities in science achievement varied depending on grade level
and across time, 57 and the remaining gender gaps in science are
shrinking. 58 Research also reveals that more males score among the
highest and lowest scores on standardized tests and that this
pattern increases with age. 59 Girls and boys also have similar
abilities and behavior patterns on a variety of other measures. 60
Girls also outperform boys, or achieve more favorable outcomes
than boys, on many measures. For instance, girls consistently
outscore boys in reading and writing assessments at the fourth-,
eighth-, and twelfth-grade levels, and they have done so since the
early 1990s. 61 Other research indicates that girls consistently
receive higher grades than boys. 62 The NCES report reveals that
girls repeat a grade at lower rates than boys63 and are less likely to
drop out of school. 64 Elementary school girls are less likely than boys
to be identified as having a learning disability, emotional disturbance, or a speech impediment. 65 Boys also are more likely to engage
in violent behavior while on school property66 and to engage in risky
behavior, such as alcohol or other drug use. 67 These disparities in
conduct may be important later in life because "[d]own the road,
there is evidence that poorer 'noncognitive skills' (not academic
56. Id. at 6.
57. See id. at 30.
58. See id. at 7.
59. See COLE, supra note 51, at 18.
60. See Nancy Levit, Separating Equals: Educational Research and the Long-Term
Consequences of Sex Segregation, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 451,471 (1999); see also FREEMAN,
supra note 52, at 32 (discussing data that reveal that no differences existed between the sexes
in U.S. history scores).
61. See FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 28; Thomas Newkirk, The Quiet Crisis in Boys'
Literacy, Eouc. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Sept. 10, 2003, at 34 (discussing how boys lag
substantially behind girls in reading and writing).
62. See COLE, supra note 51, at 18; Levit, supra note 60, at 472; Christina A. Samuels,
Report: Boys' and Girls' 'Well-Being' Tracks Closely, EDUC. WK. (Bethesda, Md.), Mar. 23,
2005, at 8 (noting Judith Kleinfeld's contention that while girls previously had only a trivial
gap in superior grades, today that "gap is fundamentally different").
63. See FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 40.
64. See id. at 56.
65. See id. at 42.
66. See id. at 52-53.
67. See id. at 54-55.
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capacity but work habits and conduct) may be what hobbles males
most."68 At the undergraduate and graduate school levels, the
complexity of the gender disparities continues. Since the mid-1980s,
women have earned more than half of all bachelor's degrees and
now earn more than half of all graduate degrees; however, women
still earn some graduate degrees consistent with historical gender
patterns, including obtaining more advanced degrees than men in
education, psychology, and health sciences. 69
This achievement data, along with the research contending that
both girls and boys experience adverse treatment in the classroom,
illustrates the modern-day complexity of educational outcomes
and experiences along gender lines. Unfortunately, this research
indicates that both sexes experience discrimination, misidentification, and undesirable educational outcomes in distinct ways. This
complex array of gender equity concerns has led some educators to
consider single-sex public education as one possible way to address
the disparate experiences and outcomes of girls and boys. 70
In addition to examining single-sex education as an option to
address gender equity issues, urban educators in particular began
exploring single-sex education as a way to address some of the
concerns plaguing their districts. 71 "[U]rban school districts and
parents from New York to California cautiously looked toward
single-sex schooling both to address the much-publicized needs of
adolescent girls across the economic spectrum and to resolve the
compelling problems confronting inner-city boys."72 Single-sex
education may be particularly appealing to urban districts because
the research of one prominent single-sex researcher, Cornelius
Riordan, contends that the benefits of single-sex schools for student
achievement are "limited to students of lower socioeconomic status
and/or students who are disadvantaged historically-females and
68. Hulbert, supra note 42, at 14.
69. See FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 78, 82. Women earn forty-six percent of all firstprofessional degrees in fields such as law, dentistry, and medicine. See id. at 82.
70. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, SEPARATED BY SEX: A CRITICAL LoOK AT SINGLE-SEX
EDUCATION FOR GIRLS 1-3 (1998); SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 4-5; Datnow & Hubbard, supra
note 29, at 2-3; Morgan, supra note 1, at 389-90.
71. See Minow, supra note 1, at 823 ("It is striking how much of the advocacy for singlesex public education-for boys as well as for girls--occurs as people try to improve failing
inner city schools.").
72. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 4-5.
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raciaVethnic/religious minorities (both males and females). "73
Because urban school districts have higher concentrations of poor
and minority students than suburban or rural schools, single-sex
schools could help educators improve achievement where other
reforms too often have failed.
Finally, as noted in the Introduction, the No Child Left Behind
Act of2001 authorized school districts to use some funds for singlesex schools and classrooms. 74 The OCR announced in May 2002 that
it was planning to amend the regulations under Title IX that govern
these schools. 75 In March 2004, the OCR published its proposed
revisions to these regulations and signaled its intention to abandon
its prior interpretation of Title IX, under which a district that
offered a single-sex public school was required to provide a comparable single-sex public school for the other sex. 76 Instead, the proposed
regulations would allow a district to offer a single-sex school to one
sex while providing "substantially equal educational opportunities
in a single-sex school, single-sex education unit, or coeducational
school" to the excluded sex. 77 If this interpretation is included in the
final regulation, the elimination of the federal regulatory requirement to open two comparable single-sex schools will make single-sex
schools a more attractive option for some educators. The increased
flexibility in the federal requirements will also increase educators'
focus on understanding their constitutional obligations for such
schools.
73. Riordan, supra note 51, at 14. Riordan concludes that single-sex schools benefit some
students because the schools "provide an avenue for students to make a proacademic choice,
thereby affirming their intrinsic agreement to work in the kind of environment we identify
as effective and equitable." ld. at 28.
74. See Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 5131(a)(23), 115 Stat. 1425, 1782 (2001) (to be codified at
20 u.s.c. § 6301).
75. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000); Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education
Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (proposed
May 8, 2002) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106); Single-Sex Classes and Schools: Guidelines
on Title IX Requirements, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,102 (proposed May 8, 2002) (to be codified at 34
C.F.R. pt. 106).
76. Compare Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276-77 (proposed March 9, 2004) (to
be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106), with Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. at 31,103 (describing the prior
"longstanding interpretation, policy, and practice to require that the 'comparable school' must
also be single-sex").
77. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 11,285 (emphasis added).
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Educators may decide to open single-sex public elementary and
secondary schools to achieve one or more of several objectives. Those
objectives are examined next.

B. The Objectives of Single-Sex Public Schools
Educators develop and maintain single-sex public schools for a
variety of reasons. The four objectives examined in this section are
the following: (1) to improve educational outcomes for students; (2)
to offer students and parents a diverse array of educational options;
(3) to compensate students for past or present discrimination; and
(4) to conduct an educational experiment. To satisfy intermediate
scrutiny, the objective must be sufficiently important to support a
sex classification and the objective must have actually motivated
the governmental actor. 78 Therefore, the objectives for single-sex
schools should be based on evidence about the current educational
problems, needs, and barriers that educators are attempting to
address.

1. To Improve Educational Outcomes for Students
Scholars and educators debate whether existing research on
single-sex schools establishes that single-sex public education will
benefit students. 79 Several scholars, researchers, and panels of
78. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfield, 420 U.S.
636, 648-49 (1975).
79. Those who contend that research does not provide evidence that single-sex education
benefits students include the following: Pamela Haag, Single-Sex Education in Grades K-12,
in THE JOSSEY-BASS READER ON GENDER IN EDUCATION 647, 661-64 (Elisa Rassen ed., 2002)
(discussing studies concluding that differences in outcome between single-sex education and
coeducation cannot be attributed to school type); Brian Johnson, Admitting that Women's Only
Public Education Is Unconstitutional and Advancing the Equality of the Sexes, 25 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 75-85 (2002); Levit, supra note 60, at 489, 503 (contending that
"[n)umerous studies, both in the United States and abroad, find no significant differences
between the impact of coeducational and of single-sex schools on student performance and
achievement" and that "[t)he touted 'general consensus' about positive education and
socialization effects of single-sex education simply does not exist"); Vojdik, supra note 17, at
93. Others argue that the research establishes that single-sex education benefits students.
See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 803-06; Morgan, supra note 1, at 397-401, 453; Ransome
& Moulton, supra note 29, at 596-99; Amanda E. Koman, Note, Urban, Single-Sex, Public
Secondary Schools: Advancing Full Development of the Talent and Capacities of America's
Young Women, 39 WM. & MARYL. REV. 507,526-27 (1998).
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experts have undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the existing
research and literature on single-sex schools. 80 Some scholars,
however, have indicated that additional research on single-sex
public education is both needed and desirable. 81
This Article describes some of the research on single-sex education that a court could find sufficiently persuasive to establish that
single-sex education benefits some students82 and thus conclude
that the objective of a single-sex school is sufficiently important to
justify a sex classification. For example, research indicates that
single-sex environments appear to decrease the likelihood that
girls and boys will view certain subjects as typically masculine or
feminine. 83 Students also perceive single-sex environments as
providing higher levels of organization, order, and control. 84
Single-sex schools also may focus students' attention on academics
and away from popularity and attractiveness for girls, and athletics
for boys, which may distract many students from academics in
coeducational schools. 85 For instance, several studies found that
students in single-sex schools devoted more time to homework, had
80. See generally AM. AsS'N OFUNIV. WOMEN, supra note 70; 1 OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH
& IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'TOFEDUC., SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING: PERSPECTIVES FROM PRACTICE
AND RESEARCH (Debra K Hollinger ed., 1993); SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 188-236; Patricia
B. Campbell & Jo Sanders, Challenging the System: Assumptions and Data Behind the Push
for Single-Sex Schooling, in GENDER IN POLICY AND PRACTICE, supra note 29, at 31, 31-46;
Haag, supra note 79, at 647-76; Riordan, supra note 51, at 10-30; Levit, supra note 60, at 464526; Fred A. Mael, Single-Sex and Coeducational Schooling: Relationships to Socioemotional
and Academic Development, 68 REV. Enuc. RES. 101 (1998). One problem with some of the
research is the tremendous difficulty in separating out the impact of the single-sex
environment from other attributes of the single-sex environment. See Minow, supra note 1,
at 827.
81. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 235-36; Riordan, supra note 51, at 13; Isabelle K
Pinzler, Separate but Equal Education in the Context of Gender, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 785,
804-05 (2004).
82. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 70, at 2; 1 OFFICE OF EDUC. RESEARCH &
IMPROVEMENT, supra note 80, at ii (finding that "single-sex education provides educational
benefits for some students"); SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 198-227, 235; Haag, supra note 79,
at 664-70 (noting that some "[s)tudies that have discovered positive achievement outcomes
attributable to the single-sex environment have all dealt with single-sex schools rather than
classes," and that research does reveal a consensus on the benefits of single-sex education on
some indicators); Mael, supra note 80, at 117.
83. See SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 235; Haag, supra note 79, at 653-54; Mael, supra
note 80, at 111. But see SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 208 (noting several studies with contrary
results).
84. See Haag, supra note 79, at 655.
85. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 198-200.
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higher aspirations for their academic and educational achievement,
and wanted to be remembered for their scholastic abilities, rather
than for their leadership in student activities or popularity. 86
Studies that find positive effects in single-sex schools emphasize
that the characteristics of students' peer groups, including more
academically oriented peers, and peer influence may affect outcomes
and be indirectly related to the school's composition. 87
Studies also reveal a consensus that girls educated in single-sex
environments show a greater preference for science, technology, and
math than girls educated in coeducational environments. 88 In
addition, more positive attitudes of girls toward science and math
in single-sex schools may influence course enrollment and decisions
in their careers; however, research is mixed on whether a more
positive attitude improves achievement in these subjects. 89 Studies
have consistently found that while girls in coeducational schools
may draw their self-concept from their physical appearance, "girls
in single-sex schools may draw greater confidence from academic
competence. "9°Furthermore, girls are subjected to harassment from
the opposite sex more than boys, and single-sex schools reduce the
opportunities for this type ofharassment to occur. 91 Some conclude,
however, that the positive impact of single-sex education for girls
depends on the relationships, values, and environment within the
school. 92
The research on the impact of single-sex education on boys is less
conclusive. Some researchers and scholars conclude that boys
perform better in coeducational environments and that single-sex
86. See id. at 199; Mael, supra note 80, at 107.
87. See Haag, supra note 79, at 669.
88. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 207-08, 235; Haag, supra note 79, at 653; Levit,
supra note 60, at 493; Mael, supra note 80, at 108-09, 111. But see Levit, supra note 60, at 494
(noting one study that did not find a positive effect on girls' attitudes regarding math).
89. Compare SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 207 ("Research from more developed countries
has generally found that although girls tend to have less gendered and more positive attitudes
toward math and science in single-sex schools, which may influence their subsequent course
enrollment and career choices, that advantage does not necessarily pay off in the short run
in achievement gains."), with Mael, supra note 80, at 108-09 (discussing several studies that
found higher achievement for girls in math or science in single-sex schools).
90. Haag, supra note 79, at 670.
91. See Mael, supra note 80, at 115. Single-sex schools do not eliminate the possibility for
sexual harassment to occur because students may be harassed by students of the same sex.
92. See Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 36.
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schools disadvantage boys. 93 For example, Nancy Levit contends
that "the majority of research suggests that boys are served best,
academically and socially, in coeducational environments. The
effects of single-sex education for boys thus are at best, neutral, and
at worst, negative. "94 Other research suggests that some boys,
particularly disadvantaged boys, benefit from single-sex education. 95
For example, Cornelius Riordan's research indicates that "[s]inglesex schools do not greatly influence the academic achievement of
affluent or advantaged students, but they do for poor disadvantaged
students .... [W]hite middle-class (or affluent) boys and girls do not
suffer any loss by attending a single-sex school.. .. At worse, they
realize a neutral outcome .... "96 One researcher has contended that
the disparate research outcomes for girls and boys in single-sex
schools result from the overwhelming focus of researchers on girls. 97
The parties in United States v. Virginia that challenged the
Virginia Military Institute's single-sex admissions policy did not
contest that "[s]ingle-sex education affords pedagogical benefits to
at least some students."98 Given the research supporting this
conclusion, the Court is unlikely to reject it in the near future.
Improved educational outcomes also typically underlie the objectives
of single-sex public schools discussed below.

2. To Offer Diverse Educational Opportunities
Offering single-sex and coeducational schools can increase
diversity in educational institutions because it allows students and
parents to choose the school that best fits a student's educational
and developmental needs. 99 For example, in developing a pilot study
of single-sex schools in California, the California Department of
Education made clear that the principal purpose was to increase the

93. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 220 (noting that the conclusion that "coeducation
might better serve boys" is a "general theme running through the literature").
94. Levit, supra note 60, at 500.
95. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 235.
96. Riordan, supra note 51, at 18.
97. See Mael, supra note 80, at 117.
98. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,535 (1996).
99. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 867-68; Kristin S. Caplice, The Case for Public
Single-Sex Education, 18 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'V 227, 251-52 (1994).
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options for public school students. 100 Proponents of increasing
school choice contend that such choice can empower families to
select the most effective schools for their children and can increase
the educational options for low-income children, who are typically
denied the choices that upper income children routinely exercise. 101
Proponents also contend that school choice will encourage competition between public and private schools that may cause both public
and private schools to improve and that school choice can be used
to promote equal educational opportunity. 102 While diversity in
educational opportunities only contributes value if the additional
educational opportunities offered are "educationally beneficial,"103
the research evidence discussed above supports the contention that
single-sex education will benefit some students. 104
The Court's opinion in Virginia strongly supports the conclusion
that the Court will find increasing diversity of educational options
a sufficiently important objective for single-sex schools, at least
when such div~rsity is offered to both sexes. The Court indicated
that it did "not question the Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational opportunities," in response to
arguments from amici about the potential benefit of single-sex

100. See AMANDA DATNOW ET AL., IS SINGLE GENDER SCHOOLING VIABLE IN THE PuBLIC
SECTOR?: LESSONS FROM CALIFORNIA'S PILOT PROGRAM 6 (2001); SALOMONE, supra note 17,
at 228-29. This is also one ofthe goals of the proposed amendments to the Title IX regulations
for single-sex schools. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or
Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 67 Fed. Reg. 31,098 (proposed May 8, 2002)
(to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).
101. See Howard Fuller, The Continuing Struggle for School Choice, in EDUCATIONAL
FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA: BROWN V. BOARD AFTER HALF A CENTURY 1, 2-4 (David
Salisbury & Casey Lartigue, Jr. eds., 2004) [hereinafter EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN
AMERICA).
102. See Paul E. Peterson, The Meaning of Zelman and the Future of School Choice, in
EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA, supra note 101, at 53, 66; Gerard Toussaint
Robinson, Can the Spirit of Brown Survive in the Era of School Choice?: A Legal and Policy
Perspective, 45 How. L.J. 281, 335 (2002) ("It would better serve our nation and its
schoolchildren if we discover innovative ways to use school choice as a means to achieve
desegregation, integration, nondiscrimination, and equal educational opportunity.").
103. Morgan, supra note 1, at 398-99.
104. But see Jenny L. Matthews, Comment,Admission Denied: An Examination ofa Single·
Sex Public School Initiative in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. REv. 2032, 2056 (2004) (arguing
that offering a diversity of educational options is not an important governmental interest
because it is not an end, but rather a means, to achieve the important goal of successfully
educating all students).
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schools. 105 The Court concluded that Virginia could not establish
that it adopted the single-sex policy at VMI to promote diverse
educational opportunities because Virginia's history of single-sex
and coeducational public schools revealed that VMI's exclusion of
women was not adopted for this purpose. 106 Nevertheless, Virginia's
failure to make this showing will not preclude a school district
from establishing a genuine interest in providing a variety of
educational opportunities in single-sex and coeducational schools in
the future. 107

3. To Remedy Discrimination
Single-sex schools also may be developed to address past or
present discrimination in coeducational schools. 108 Such discrimination may include sexual harassment and disparate treatment
that may harm the achievement of girls. 109 Past discrimination
against girls and women may affect not only educational outcomes,
but it may also affect the career aspirations and choices that girls

105. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,534 n.7 (1996) (emphasis added); cf Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 655 (2002) (upholding the Cleveland, Ohio, voucher
program that allowed students to choose among public and private schools).
106. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 535.
107. For example, a genuine interest in offering choice could be demonstrated by a district
offering students a variety of educational options, such as specialized schools that focus on
particular subject areas like math or science. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 13 (discussing
the fact that the neighborhood in which New York City opened its first single-sex school
already included a number of educational options for students).
108. See SOMMERS, supra note 43, at 171 (quoting the argument made by Deborah Brake
of the National Women's Law Center that the network of programs and scholarships for girls
and women may be legitimate, "[i]n light of the history of discrimination against women in
education and the barriers that female students continue to face based on their gender");
Willinger, supra note 37, at 273-75, 278 (noting that some argue that "all-girls schools or allgirls classrooms are necessary as a response to gender discrimination in the classroom. There
is widespread evidence of the prevalence of such discrimination, and increasingly this
evidence forms the basis of arguments in favor of single-sex education for girls").
109. See supra notes 29-41 and accompanying text.
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make if they perceive a field to be unwelcoming or unavailable. 110
Schools also could identify and address discrimination against boys.
The Court acknowledged in Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan that "[i]n limited circumstances, a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly
assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened. "111
However, a state actor that adopts a sex classification to remedy
discrimination must demonstrate that "members of the gender
benefited by the classification actually suffer a disadvantage related
to the classification."112 Therefore, a school district could only
develop a single-sex school to address discrimination if it identified
ways in which girls or boys had been harmed by discrimination and
tailored the program to address that harm. 113 For example, some
contend that the Young Women's Leadership School (YWLS) in
Harlem, which emphasizes math and science, was established to
address past discrimination against girls and women, including the
discrimination that girls experienced in coeducational schools and
the low participation rates of women in math and science occupations.114 A district that establishes a single-sex school for remedial
purposes should also present evidence that it is attempting to
address past or present discrimination in its coeducational schools,
110. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 35, at 117 ("Despite the many programs
and guidelines devoted to reducing bias and efforts by counselors, the media, and others
involved in education, occupational sex-role socialization still pervades and inhibits the career
exploration process."); see also Pat Galloway, "Bad Idea. You'll Flunk Out," TIME, Mar. 7,
2005, at 58-59 (describing the author's persistent efforts to overcome the repeated
discouragement she encountered when she expressed her interest in becoming an engineer
as a young woman and throughout her engineering career).
111. 458 u.s. 718, 728 (1982).
112. Id.
113. Although the Court has previously upheld sex classifications that remedy past
discrimination against girls and women, some might question whether the historical
discrimination that girls and women experienced remains a sufficient justification for a sex
classification in today's schools, particularly because the Supreme Court has not addressed
such a classification in recent years. However, examining this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article. For the purposes of this Article, the assumption is made that past discrimination
against girls and women remains an important governmental interest that would support a
sex classification today.
114. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, A Postscript on VMI, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 59, 63
(1997); Carrie Corcoran, Comment, Single-Sex Education After VMI: Equal Protection and
East Harlem's Young Women's Leadership School, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 987, 990-91 (1997). But
see Vojdik, supra note 17, at 97 ("Ult is not clear that New York City school officials agreed
to create YWLS to redress past discrimination in public education.").
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because a failure to do so could undermine an argument that the
district is actually attempting to remedy discrimination.

4. To Conduct an Educational Experiment
Another possible objective of single-sex schools is to conduct an
experiment that examines the outcomes of such schools. An
experiment may assess if and when single-sex public schools
result in unique benefits for students, which students benefit from
single-sex schools, and how to increase the benefits and reduce
any negative ramifications of such schools. Such an experiment
could address some of the deficiencies in the existing research on
single-sex schools by attempting to control for factors that may have
influenced past results. 115 Courts could conclude that an educational
experiment on the benefits of single-sex public education is sufficiently important to support a sex classification. 116
In light of the potential objectives that could serve as an important governmental interest for establishing single-sex schools,
the next section describes some of the recent successes and shortcomings of single-sex schools and briefly examines the history of
single-sex schools.
C. The Successes and Failures of Present and Past Si7Jgle-Sex
Public Schools

The growth in single-sex education over the last decade, particularly in recent years, has been tremendous and has resulted in
numerous successes, as well as some failures. Although only three
single-sex public schools existed in this country in 1995 (excluding
schools for pregnant girls), by April 2006 the NASSPE identified
forty-four single-sex public elementary and secondary schools that
operated in the United States during the 2005-06 school year. 117
Eleven single-sex public schools opened or became single-sex in the
115. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 235-36; Pinzler, supra note 81, at 805-06.
116. The Ninth Circuit previously upheld educational research on how to improve
education in urban public schools as a compelling state interest that justified the use of race
as a factor in admissions to an elementary school in California. See Hunter v. Regents of the
Univ. ofCRI., 190 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999).
117. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
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2004-05 school year and thirteen additional public schools became
single-sex in the 2005-06 school year. 118 In addition to sex-segregated schools, the NASSPE reported that 165 schools offered one or
more single-sex classes as of April 2006. 119 In sum, at least 209
schools offered some form of single-sex education by April 2006. 120
The new generation of single-sex public schools is typically
composed of either solitary institutions or pairs of similar schools
with one school for each sex. Of the forty-four single-sex public
schools on the NASSPE's website, for the 2005-06 school year,
~ighteen appear to be "dual academies," or two single-sex schools
that provide similar educational opportunities to girls and boys,
although a careful assessment of the nature and location of these
schools would be necessary to determine if students are in fact
provided similar opportunities. 121 Although the structure of dual
academies may vary from state to state, such schools typically serve
both sexes in the same or nearby facilities, separating students into
single-sex classrooms. 122 At some dual academies, girls and boys
may participate together in extracurricular activities, lunchtime,
or even some academic subjects, and they may interact before and
118. See id.
119. See Nat'l Ass'n for Single-Sex Pub. Educ., Single-Sex Classrooms,
http://www.singlesexschools.org/schools-classrooms.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) [hereinafter
NASSPE, Classrooms).
120. See id.; NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
121. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. The schools in the 2004-05 school year that
appeared to offer similar opportunities and grade levels to boys and girls are the following:
the San Francisco 49ers Academies in East Palo Alto, California; the Jefferson Leadership
Academies in Long Beach, California; Thurgood Marshall Elementary School in Seattle,
Washington; Brighter Choice Charter School in Albany, New York; FitzSimons High School
in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Southern Leadership Academies in Louisville, Kentucky;
Withrow University High School in Cincinnati, Ohio; Westwind Middle School Academy in
Phoenix, Arizona; Lincoln and Stewart Elementary Schools in Toledo, Ohio; James Irwin
Middle School in Colorado Springs, Colorado; Mount Scott Learning Centers in Portland,
Oregon; Pepper Middle School in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; the Crossroads Preparatory
Academy and the Harte School in Columbus, Ohio; the Chase Academy for Communication
Arts in Columbus, Ohio; Minneapolis Academy in Minneapolis, Minnesota; Capitol PreCollege Academy for Girls and Capitol Pre-College Academy for Boys in Baton Rouge,
Louisiana; The Langston Charter Middle School in Greenville, South Carolina; the Athena
School of Excellence for Girls and the Alpha School of Excellence for Boys in Youngstown,
Ohio; and the Charles Drew Elementary School and Duncan Elementary School in Gary,
Indiana. To reach nineteen schools that have offered similar opportunities for both sexes, this
Article counts separate schools that appeared paired together to offer single-sex opportunities
to each sex as one school. See id.
122. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 227-28.
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after school. 123 For example, at the Brighter Choice Charter Schools
(BCCS) in Albany, New York, girls and boys share the same
building, teachers, and learning resources. 124 The school has a
unique "Learning Guarantee" through which the school will pay for
tuition to a private school if a student with good attendance for
three years fails any statewide reading, science, or math exam. 125
The students are primarily African Americans and Hispanic
Americans, and the school only admits students whose family
income is below the poverty line. 126 The school has shown promising
results since opening in 2002, including student math and reading
scores that are substantially higher than those for other economically disadvantaged students nationwide. 127
The Thurgood Marshall Elementary School in Seattle,
Washington, achieved noteworthy success after it separated the
sexes into different classrooms. 128 While none of the girls passed the
math portion of the state exam in the year before the change, fiftythree percent of the girls passed in the year after the change. 129 The
boys' scores on the reading portion of this test improved "from the
lOth percentile to the 66th percentile. "130 Discipline referrals that
were at thirty per day before the change dropped to fewer than
two per day after the change. 131 Similarly, ninety-five percent ofthe
students at Withrow University High School in Cincinnati, Ohio,
passed the state reading proficiency test in 2003-04., while only
forty-five percent passed the test before the school b~came singlesex.132
In addition to dual academies or pairs of single-sex schools, some
school districts offer a single-sex school for only one sex. Through
the 2005-06 school year, a review of the forty-four single-sex schools
listed on the NASSPE website revealed that at least eight single-sex
123. See id. at 228.
124. See id. at 233-34.
125. See NASSPE, supra note 5.
126. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 25.
127. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 233-34; Gains in Student Perfonnance at Brighter
Choice Charter Schools, 4th-Grade Cohort (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.brighterchoice.org/
TestScores. pdf.
128. See Sax, supra note 22.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
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girls' schools appeared to exist without a similar school for boys
serving the same grades and geographic region, and at least five
boys' schools did not have a similar school for girls serving the same
grades and geographic region. 133
Two of the girls' schools, the Philadelphia High School for Girls
and Western High School in Baltimore, opened in the mid-1840s
and have since remained all girls' schools. 134 These schools also have
achieved considerable success. The Philadelphia School for Girls
serves over fifteen hundred predominantly poor students in grades
nine through twelve. 135 The magnet school has rigorous admissions
standards and the students have a ninety-eight percent acceptance
rate to college. 136 The school is one of three Philadelphia high
schools with a zero percent dropout rate, and it consistently scores
among the top schools in the city on statewide math, reading, and
writing tests. 137 Similarly, Western High School has a very high
statewide test score passage rate, a high college placement rate, and

133. See id. In the 2005-06 school year, the eight girls' schools that did not appear to have
a similar school for boys serving the same grades and geographic region were the following:
Western High School in Baltimore, Maryland; Philadelphia High School for Girls in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Spectrum High School for Girls in Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Young
Women's Leadership School in New York, New York; Young Women's Leadership Charter
School in Chicago, Illinois; Middle College High School in Guilford County, North Carolina;
Irma Rangel Young Women's Leadership School in Dallas, Texas; and Charity Adams Earley
Academy for Girls in Dayton, Ohio. ld. The five boys' schools that did not appear to have a
similar school for girls serving the same grades and geographic region are Pro-Vision in
Houston, Texas; William A. Lawson Institute for Peace and Prosperity Preparatory Academy
for Boys in Houston, Texas; Middle College at North Carolina A&T in Guilford County, North
Carolina; Bedford Stuyvesant Preparatory Charter School for Excellence in Brooklyn, New
York; and Edgar Evans Elementary School in Indianapolis, Indiana. I d. For a thoughtful
analysis of why Middle College High School and Middle College at North Carolina A&T do not
provide substantially equal opportunities for girls and boys, see Matthews, supra note 104,
at 2043.
Assessing whether six of the eight single-sex schools in New York City provide
substantially equal opportunities for girls and boys is difficult. These schools are the Eagle
Academy for Young Men; the Urban Assembly Academy for History and Citizenship for Young
Men; Girls Prep; the Young Women's Leadership School, Queen's Campus; the Urban
Assembly School of Business for Young Women; and the Young Women's Leadership School
of the Bronx. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5. Therefore, these schools have been excluded
from the analysis about whether schools are substantially equal or solitary single-sex schools.
134. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 24-25.
135. Id. at 25.
136. Id.
137. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 31.
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a low dropout rate. 138 The school educates over one thousand
students, who are mostly African American, and about forty percent
ofthe students qualify for free and reduced-price lunches. 139
A more recently opened single-sex public school is the YWLS in
New York City's East Harlem, which serves predominantly poor
African American and Hispanic American students. 140 The school
opened in the fall of 1996 and graduated its first class, consisting of
thirty-two students, in 2001. 141 YWLS emphasizes math, science,
technology, leadership, and the humanities, providing a middle and
high school education. 142 Teachers and staff give students "intense
and personalized attention," and class size is smaller than classes
in most other New York City public schools. 143 Rosemary Salomone
describes the school in her thought-provoking book on single-sex
education entitled Same, Different, Equal: Rethinking Single-Sex
Schooling as "an oasis of excellence and hope in a desert ofpoverty,
crime, and despair." 144 The school's success in its first few years has
been noteworthy. All of the students in the first two graduating
classes were admitted to college, and the students' academic
achievement continues to improve. 145 In math and reading, the
students typically score "[thirty] percent higher than average for
students in other New York City coeducational schools."146
Finally, at least five boys' schools on NASPPE's website do not
appear to have a similar school for girls serving the ..same grades
and geographic region. 147 For example, in Houston, Texas, two
schools are limited only to boys. The William A. Lawson Institute
for Peace and Prosperity Preparatory Academy for Boys serves sixth
through eighth grade boys. 148 Its academic program focuses on
activities, provides mentors in academic subjects, integrates
math and science technology, and addresses student behavior
138. !d. at 34.
139. !d. at 32-33; NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
140. See Riordan, supra note 51, at 24.
141. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 10, 13.
142. ld. at 13; Riordan, supra note 51, at 24.
143. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 21.
144. Id. at 18.
145. Id. at 24.
146. Riordan, supra note 51, at 24.
147. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
148. See Houston lndep. Sch. Dist. (HISD), HISD Charter Schools, http://dept.houstonisd.
org/charterschools/charterlist.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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management through a student court system. 149 The other school,
Pro-Vision, is a small all-boys' residential school that focuses on
at-risk youth. 150
Not all single-sex schools have experienced the success of the
schools noted above. 151 For example, two middle schools, one in
Newport, Kentucky, and one in Idaho Falls, Idaho, abandoned all
single-sex classrooms after one year when they failed to achieve
significant grade or test score improvement. 152 At Newport Middle
School, discipline referrals for the boys soared. 153 In addition, a 2001
study of a Califomia pilot program, in which six districts opened
single-sex academies for each sex, found that "[t]raditional gender
stereotypes were often reinforced in the single gender academies."154
These stereotypes still existed, even though a focus of the legislation
and policymakers "was to ensure equality of the boys' and girls'
academies." 155 The study concluded that educators focused on
equality of resources, while failing to "adequately reflect upon the
hidden or overt gender biases (to the disadvantage ofboth boys and
girls) that often existed in their organizational, pedagogical, and
curricular practices. "156 For example, one district taught America's
early history by teaching boys about survival skills, while girls
learned about sewing and quilting. 157 Even more troubling was the
finding that the separation of "boys and girls on the same campus
led to a dichotomous understanding of gender, where girls were seen
as 'good' and boys were seen as 'bad.'"158
These problems echo some ofthe early shortcomings of single-sex
public education in the United States, and they remind those who
are currently considering this option of the potential misuses and
dangers of single-sex public schools. Single-sex education has a
troubled history in the United States. 159 Initially, only boys were
149. See id.
150. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
151. See Sax, supra note 22.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. DATNOW ET AL., supra note 100, at 7.
155. I d. at 22.
156. I d. at 6.
157. See id. at 40.
158. ld. at 7.
159. "[P]ublic education in America began as single-sex schooling and very unequal singlesex schooling at that." Patricia B. Campbell & Ellen Wahl, Of Two Minds: Single-Sex
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offered education in most instances; girls were provided limited
opportunities in summer schools or after the boys had left
school. 16° Financial constraints and convenience, rather than
concerns about pedagogy or child development, drove the move
toward coeducational schools, particularly in rural areas. 161
Beyond the elementary grades, teachers initially taught girls and
boys the same subjects; however, industrialization and rapid
migration prompted schools to focus on preparing students for the
practical realities of their traditional roles in society-that is, girls
as homemakers and boys as breadwinners. 162 High schools began to
focus on vocational education that offered different opportunities
to the sexes, including secretarial skills and homemaking for girls,
and auto mechanics and woodworking for boys. 163 These gender
distinctions affected some academic courses that were viewed as
more suitable for boys or for girls. 164 In some areas, including cities
such as New York and Boston, girls were provided a secondary
education in single-sex schools that generally had a more limited
curriculum and less funding per student than boys' schools. 165
Eventually, most of the single-sex public schools closed, and by
1900, ninety-eight percent of the public secondary schools in the
United States were coeducational. 166 Nevertheless, limited instances
of single-sex education, along with their attendant stereotypes and
inferior opportunities for women, persisted into the twentieth
century. 167
The stereotyping and shortcomings of past and present single-sex
schools, and the success of some of the new single-sex schools,
confirm that single-sex education must be handled with great care.
Education, Coeducation, and the Search for Gender Equity in K-12 Public Schooling, 14 N. Y.L.
ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 289, 290 (1997).
160. DAVID TYACK & ELIZABETH HANSON, LEARNING TOGETHER: A HISTORY OF
COEDUCATION IN AMERICAN PuBLIC SCHOOlS 13-20 (1992).
161. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 66-67; TYACK& HANSON, supra note 160, at 47, 58;
Jill E. Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women's "Full Citizenship": A Case Study of SexSegregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755,802-03 (2002).
162. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 66, 68.
163. See id. at 69.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 67; TYACK & HANSON, supra note 160, at 8.
166. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 67; Riordan, supra note 51, at 10; Mael, supra note
80, at 102.
167. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 795-806.
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Single-sex schools may be beneficial or harmful to students,
depending on how they are operated. The constitutional framework
for analyzing such schools should take into account the potential
benefits and harms that different structures of single-sex schools
may cause. Parts II and III examine how neither the Supreme
Court's interpretation of intermediate scrutiny nor scholarly
approaches to single-sex public schools effectively address these
concerns. 168

II. THE MANY FACES OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
In light of the potential benefits of single-sex public schools, it is
important that educators have clear guidance on their constitutional
obligations, so that they are not lost in a constitutional labyrinth
that discourages experimentation. Educators also should not face
constitutional hurdles to such schools that do not enhance the value
of these schools. However, the constitutional requirements should
include adequate safeguards that protect children from the potential
dangers of such schools, including harmful stereotypes. Courts
that adjudicate the constitutionality of single-sex public schools
should reach similar conclusions when evaluating similar schools.
Unfortunately, neither educators nor courts will find in the existing
Supreme Court case law on sex classifications the constitutional
clarity, relevance, and consistency that would create optimal
conditions for the development of single-sex public schools.
Since the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Craig v. Boren, the
Court has subjected sex classifications to intermediate scrutiny,
which requires that a sex classification serve an important governmental objective and be substantially related to the achievement of

168. As the number of single-sex schools increases, single-sex schools may be more likely
to spur litigation. For the moment, this new generation of single-sex public schools has not
yet resulted in substantial litigation, although one court prevented the opening of a single-sex
school for African American boys in Detroit. See Garrett v. Bd. ofEduc., 775 F. Supp. 1004,
1014 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that the important purpose of the academies in addressing
the crises facing urban males was "insufficient to override the rights of females to equal
opportunities"). Also, the New York City chapter of the National Organization for Women and
other civil liberties groups filed a complaint in 1996 with OCR against YWLS that has not yet
been resolved. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 15-18. Apparently, some schools avoid litigation
by not having an official single-sex admissions policy. See id. at 32, 34-35.
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that objective. 169 The requirement of a substantial relationship
between the sex classification and the government's objective has
been described as "(t]he most important difference between
heightened scrutiny and rational basis review." 170 The substantial
relationship test considers whether a sex-neutral alternative would
serve the state's objective as well as, or sometimes better than, the
sex classification. 171 The Court typically does not permit the state to
utilize a sex-based classification when the state could achieve its
objective through a sex-neutral classification. 172
To withstand the substantial relationship test, the state's
evidence must also demonstrate how the sex differential furthers
the state's objective-that is, why males and females should be
treated differently to achieve the state's objective. 173 Different
treatment of those who are similarly situated with respect to
the legislation's purpose undermines the state's argument that
the. classification significantly furthers the stated objective. 174
Furthermore, even when a sufficiently valuable objective is at stake
and this objective can arguably be achieved through a sex classification, the Court typically invalidates classifications that rest on
169_. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
170. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (stating that when the state's objective
is "as well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore
carries with it the baggage of sexual stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on
the basis of sex"); see also Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he availability
of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is often highly probative of the validity
of the classification.").
172. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150-52 (1980) (holding that a
sex classification that sought to provide for needy spouses by paying benefits to all female
surviving spouses, while requiring men to prove dependency, did not substantially further an
important objective because the needs of both female and male survivors could be served by
granting benefits either to those who demonstrate need or to all survivors); Orr, 440 U.S. at
281-83 (holding an Alabama state statute unconstitutional that required alimony to be paid
to women, but not to men, because the state conducted individualized hearings to assess the
financial circumstances of the spouses, and these hearings provided a more accurate
assessment of an individual's needs). As noted in Part II.A-B, the Court has not consistently
enforced this requirement.
173. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 203-04 (holding a law unconstitutional that prohibited the
selling of 3.2% alcohol content beer to men until they reached twenty-one years of age, while
permitting the selling of the same beer to women after they turned eighteen because,
although the statistics demonstrated an increase in driving under the influence of alcohol,
they did not relate this trend to the "age-sex differentials" before the Court).
174. See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150-52; Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-04; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
77 (1971).
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overbroad generalizations175 or that reflect or perpetuate stereotypes
about gender rolesP6 Laws based on such overbroad generalizations
or stereotypes are generally unconstitutional, even if some empirical
evidence supports them. 177
Although these guidelines appear within the Court's intermediate
scrutiny cases, the Court's interpretation of the substantial
relationship component has not been consistent. Instead, the Court's
opinions reflect a range of interpretations of the substantial
relationship requirement in which the requirement is sometimes
quite demanding and sometimes substantially less demanding. This
Part analyzes these disparate interpretations of the substantial
relationship component ofintermediate scrutiny and identifies some
of the problems these interpretations could create for single-sex
public schools.
A. The Most Demanding Interpretation of the Substantial
Relationship Test

Although the Court in United States v. Virginia and Mississippi
University for Women v. Hogan used much of the same language
that it used in other sex classification cases, 178 the Court's application of the intermediate scrutiny standard essentially required the
state to deiJ1,0nstrate that the state could not achieve its objective
unless it excluded the other sex. In Hogan, the Supreme Court held
in a five-to-four decision that Mississippi lacked an "exceedingly
persuasive justification" for maintaining a single-sex nursing school
175. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994); see also Norman R.
Deutsch, Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender
Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 185, 221-22 (2003) ("In a series
of cases, the Court has struck down classifications as being based on stereotypical overbroad
generalizations that a woman's place is in the home, women are less capable than men, and
women are financially dependent on men.").
176. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 198-99; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 & n.23
(1973); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 731-33 (2d ed.
2002).
177. See Wengler, 446 U.S. at 150-52; Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977); see
also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 76 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("(O]verbroad sex-based
generalizations are impermissible even when they enjoy empirical support.").
178. See Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally Permissible Path to Sex Equality:
The Young Women's Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 95, 10506 (1997).
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for women. 179 Although Mississippi claimed that the all-female
admissions policy addressed past discrimination against women, the
State failed to demonstrate that women did not have avenues to
pursue nursing training or to obtain leadership positions in nursing
either when the school opened or when the policy was challenged. 180
In fact, the females-only admissions policy perpetuated a stereotype
that the nursing profession is only for women. 181 Because the
classification was not actually adopted to achieve the alleged
objective, the Court held the policy invalid. 182
In addition, Mississippi failed to demonstrate that the classification was directly and substantially related to the alleged objective. 183
The Court held that the university's policy of allowing men to audit
classes "fatally undermine[d] [Mississippi's] claim that women, at
least those in the School of Nursing, are adversely affected by the
presence ofmen."184 The record revealed that allowing men to attend
the school would not affect the academic performance of women at
the school or the style in which classes were taught. 185 Furthermore,
"men in coeducational nursing schools do not dominate the classroom."186 In light of the lack of evidence to prove any adverse effect
on women from the presence of men at the school, the Court held
that denying admission to men was clearly not "necessary to reach
any of MUW's educational goals." 187
Similarly, in Virginia, by rejecting Virginia's argument that the
single-sex nature of VMI was essential to train citizen-soldiers, 188
the Court required a single-sex environment to be necessary to train
citizen-soldiers. 189 Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court's seven-to179. 458 U.S. 718, 731, 733 (1982). The Mississippi University for Women was Mississippi's
only single-sex institution of higher education; therefore, the Court did not address whether
Mississippi could offer "'separate but equal' undergraduate institutions for males and
females." Id. at 720 n.l.
180. See id. at 727-29.
181. Id. at 729.
182. ld. at 730.
183. ld.
184. ld.
185. See id. at 731.
186. ld.
187. ld. (emphasis added).
188. "Citizen-soldiers" is the term that VMI uses to describe its graduates. See United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 521-22 (1996).
189. See id. at 540-46.
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one majority, 190 held that Virginia could not exclude women from the
unique educational benefits provided at VMI. 191 Virginia offered two
justifications for excluding women from VMI: (1) the benefits of
single-sex education and the contribution of single-sex education
to diverse educational approaches would be lost if women were
admitted; and (2) admission of women would require Virginia to
modify the "adversative method"192 VMI adopted to develop
character and train leaders. 193 No party in the litigation contested
the notion that some students receive pedagogical benefits from
single-sex education or the suggestion that "diversity among public
educational institutions can serve the public good. "194 Instead, a
review of Virginia's history of excluding women from higher
education, providing them an inferior education, and converting
schools to coeducational institutions, 195 resulted in the Court finding
the first justification lacking because Virginia had not demonstrated
"that VMI was established, or ha[d] been maintained, with a view
to diversifying, by its categorical exclusion of women, educational
opportunities within the Commonwealth. "196
The Court also rejected Virginia's evidence of "gender-based
developmental differences"-including the contention that although
men thrive in a more adversative atmosphere, women need a more
cooperative environment-as a justification for excluding women
from VMI. 197 The Court concluded that gender-based developmental
differences could not justify the exclusion of women from VMI
because the record revealed that some women had the will, capacity,
and interest to fulfill all of the demands facing VMI cadets. 198 In
light of this evidence, "'neither the goal of producing citizen solders,'
190. Justice Ginsburg delivered the Court's opinion in which Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined. Justice Rehnquist wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Justice Scalia dissented, and Justice Thomas took no part in the decision. I d. at 518.
191. See id. at 519, 523, 553.
192. VMI's adversative method employs "'[p]hysicial rigor, mental stress, absolute equality
of treatment, absence of privacy, minute regulation of behavior, and indoctrination in
desirable values'" to prepare the cadets to be "citizen-soldiers." ld. at 522 (alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.O. Va. 1991)).
193. See id. at 535.
194. ld.
195. See id. at 536-38.
196. ld. at 535.
197. ld. at 541-43.
198. See id. at 520, 540-42.
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VMI's raison d'etre, 'nor VMI's implementing methodology [was]
inherently unsuitable to women.'"199 Furthermore, because some
women could satisfy the demands of VMI's methodology, the
prediction that the presence of women would downgrade VMI's
stature and destroy the adversative method was no more worthy
of credence than past predictions that the admission of women to
the practice of law or medicine would destroy those professions. 200
If the Commonwealth could still achieve its goal of training
citizen-soldiers after abandoning the single-sex admissions policy,
achievement of its goal was "not substantially advanced by women's
categorical exclusion ... from the Commonwealth's premier 'citizensoldier' corps."201 In short, Virginia's fears about the adverse effects
of admitting women were not grounded in reality, and these
unfounded fears certainly did not meet the demanding "exceedingly
persuasive" standard required for sex classifications. 202 This
conclusion indicates that VMI's admissions policy was invalidated
because Virginia failed to demonstrate that excluding women was
necessary to achieve its goal. 203
199. ld. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 899 (4th Cir. 1992)).
200. See id. at 543-45.
201. ld. at 546.
202. Id. at 534.
203. See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, United States v. Virginia's New Gender Equal
Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L.
REv. 845, 880-82, 893 (1997) (arguing that Virginia's requirement that VMI make
institutional alterations for privacy is consistent with a standard that "only necessary
differential treatment is permissible. If there is a less discriminatory way in which the
institution can achieve its result, then unequal treatment is unnecessary." (emphasis added));
Minow, supra note 1, at 830 (noting that the Court in Virginia "rejected the arguments that
single-sex education was necessary because of the physical training, absence of privacy, and
adversative method used at VMI" (emphasis added)); Kristen J. Cerven, Note, Single-Sex
Education: Promoting Equality or an Unconstitutional Divide?, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 699, 721
(contending that to survive the substantial relationship test, YWLS "must show that the
exclusion of young men is somewhat necessary to accomplishing its objective of compensating
women" (emphasis added)); Monica J. Stamm, Note, A Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex
Schools for Pregnant Girls, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1203, 1223-24 (1998) (arguing that Justice
Ginsburg "rejected the arguments of VMI's defenders that the presence of women would so
change the institution as to deny all its students the kind of distinctive education they might
have hoped to get there. In so doing, Ginsburg analyzed whether the exclusion of women from
VMI was necessary for the military college to obtain its objectives." (second emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)). But see Morgan, supra note 1, at 411 ("[T]he Court has never interpreted
intermediate scrutiny to require that sex-based classifications be the most narrowly tailored
means available to achieve a government objective. Whether or not alternative means are
available, if the sex-specific legislation furthers the government objective and passes an anti-
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The adoption of a requirement that a sex classification must be
necessary to achieve its important objective was particularly
noteworthy because this least-restrictive-means analysis is typically
reserved for strict scrutiny of suspect classifications, 204 such as
those based on race, which are only permitted when they are, among
other things, "necessary to further a compelling governmental
interest."205 Nevertheless, the Court's demanding interpretation206
subordination test, the Court has upheld the use of those classifications." (footnote omitted));
Sharon E. Rush, Diversity: The Red Herring of Equal Protection, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 43,
44-45 (1997) (arguing that the Court applied intermediate scrutiny in Virginia and did not
apply strict scrutiny, which would have required "Virginia to demonstrate that the exclusion
of women is necessary to achieve its compelling interest in having diverse educational
opportunities for its male citizens").
204. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 573-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
adopted a least-restrictive-means test because "[t]here is simply no support in our cases for
the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to characteristics that
hold true in every instance"); Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 203, at 883 ("[B]y requiring VMI
to make institutional adjustments to admit qualified women, the Court has elevated equal
protection analysis to the level of the least-restrictive-means analysis of strict scrutiny.");
Steven A. Delchin, Comment, United States v. Virginia and Our Evolving "Constitution":
Playing Peek-a-Boo with the Standard of Scrutiny for Sex-Based Classifications, 4 7 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1121, 1132 (1997) (noting that in contrast to the analysis in Virginia, generally
"intermediate scrutiny is not governed by a least-restrictive-means analysis or some 'perfect
fit' paradigm"). But see Mary A. Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns":
Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1447, 1449 (2000) ("For a sex-respecting rule to withstand constitutional scrutiny by the
Court, it seems to be at least necessary and usually sufficient that it embody some perfect
proxy.").
205. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (concluding that "[w]hen race-based action is necessary to
further a compelling interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the
'narrow tailoring' test").
206. The Court's demanding interpretation of intermediate scrutiny in Virginia left many
confused regarding the meaning and proper application of the intermediate scrutiny standard.
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 15, at 75 ("After United States v. Virginia, it is not simple to
describe the appropriate standard of review, States must satisfy a standard somewhere
between intermediate and strict scrutiny."); Jeffrey A. Barnes, Case Note, The Supreme
Court's "Exceedingly [Un]persuasive" Application of Intermediate Scrutiny in United States
v. Virginia, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 523, 523 (1997) ("The Court's apparent heightening of the level
of scrutiny applied to gender-based classifications from the previously used intermediate
scrutiny to an ambiguous standard ... equivalent to strict scrutiny, will further inhibit
legislatures from classifying or treating individuals differently based upon their gender.");
Delchin, supra note 204, at 1131, 1134 (arguing that "[t]he statements, formulations, and
descriptions in the VMI majority opinion may presage the Court's final 'evolution' to strict
scrutiny for sex-based classifications"); Pherabe Kolb, Comment, Reaching for the Silver
Lining: Constructing a Nonremedial yet "Exceedingly Persuasive" Rationale for Single-Sex
Educational Programs in Public Schools, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 367, 375 (2001) ("Although most
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of the substantial relationship test was appropriate given what
was at stake in both Virginia and Hogan. In Virginia, women were
denied access to a premier military institution with a training
philosophy and methodology that were unparalleled by any other
university in the Commonwealth. 207 Virginia tried to remedy its
constitutional violation by creating a parallel institution-the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL) at Mary Baldwin
College, an all-women's institution. 208 However, the Supreme Court
rejected this remedy as insufficient because VWIL lacked VMI's
famed adversative method. 209 In addition, VWIL and VMI were not
substantially equal in terms of tangible benefits, such as the
student body, faculty, course offerings, and facilities, nor in the
intangible benefits ofVMI's long history, including its prestigious
and extensive alumni network. 210 While scholars have noted the
difficulty in meeting the standard applied in Virginia, 211 the Court
appropriately viewed Virginia's proffered justifications with great
skepticism and found them lacking because the exclusion of women
was not necessary to achieve Virginia's educational goals. 212
Similarly, in Hogan, the Court appropriately applied a requirement that the sex classification be necessary to achieve the State's
goal. 213 The male applicant could not attend a nursing school
without driving a considerable distance nor could he obtain credit
for his degree from on-the-job training, as his female counterparts
could. 214 The Court correctly concluded that this burden should only
courts since Virginia have applied the exceedingly persuasive justification standard in much
the same way as they applied intermediate scrutiny, many courts are still unclear as to
whether Virginia heightened, or simply re-iterated, the standard of review for gender
classifications." (footnote omitted)). But see Sunstein, supra note 15, at 75 ("The revision of
the standard of review is unlikely to produce different results from those that would have
followed under the intermediate scrutiny standard, which has operated quite strictly 'in
fact."').
207. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548-54.
208. ld. at 546.
209. ld. at 548-50.
210. ld. at 546-51.
211. SeeJOHNE.NOWAK&RONALDD.ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 845 (6thed. 2000);
Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 813.
212. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 539-40.
213. See supra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
214. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 n.8 (1982); see also YUDOF ET
AL., supra note 18, at 556 ("For Joe Hogan, the practical consequence of the MUW admissions
standard was to compel him to choose between his home and vocation.").
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be placed on the plaintiff in Hogan if the State could not achieve its
objective through other means. 215
The Court has also held other sex classifications unconstitutional
because an effective, sex-neutral alternative would serve the state's
interest, thereby rendering the sex classification unnecessary. For
example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., the Court
invalidated a statute that provided benefits to widows without
proof of need, but required widowers to prove dependence or
incapacitation, because a sex-neutral alternative would have served
Congress's objective. 216 The availability of either individualized
determinations or the provision of benefits to all surviving spouses
rendered the sex classification unnecessary. 217
The Court's application of the substantial relationship test in
cases such as Virginia and Hogan stands in sharp contrast to the
Court's less demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test in other cases, as described next.

B. The Least Demanding Interpretation of the Substantial
Relationship Test
The Court has found some sex classifications to be substantially
related to the state's objective if the classification merely helps
the governmental actor achieve its objective, rather than being
necessary or essential to achieving that objective. For example, the
Court's 2001 decision in Nguyen v. INS upheld a law that required
fathers, but not mothers, of children born out of wedlock outside of
the United States to take one of three steps to establish the child's
U.S. citizenship. 218 The Court allowed a rather loose fit between
215. See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725-26. This denial is similar in some ways to Missouri's
unconstitutional attempt to force the petitioner in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada to attend
a law school for African Americans in a nearby state. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 u.s. 337, 343-44 (1938).
216. 446 u.s. 142, 151 (1980).
217. See id. at 151-52; see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979) (invalidating a
requirement that only husbands must pay alimony because the state provided for
individualized hearings to determine need, and thus, a gender-neutral classification served
the state's interest); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975) (invalidating a
"gratuitous" gender-based distinction because "without it, the statutory scheme would only
provide benefits to those men who are in fact similarly situated to the women the statute
aids").
218. 533 u.s. 53, 62, 73 (2001).
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means and ends, as Justice O'Connor noted in her dissent. 219 For
example, the Court in Nguyen acknowledged, and then dismissed
out of hand, the sex-neutral alternatives available to Congress to
ensure that a child born out of wedlock and its citizen parent had a
demonstrated opportunity to develop a relationship between the
United States, the child, and the citizen parent. 220 Therefore, the sex
classification certainly was not necessary to achieve the government's objective.
Furthermore, the Court has often permitted a loose fit between
means and ends when it has shifted its focus from whether the
classification will achieve its objective most of the time, as it
permitted in Nguyen, 221 to whether it will achieve its objective in
virtually every instance, as the Court required in Virginia. 222 The
Court in Nguyen stated that "[n]one of our gender-based classification equal protection cases have required that the statute under
consideration must be capable of achieving its ultimate objective in
every instance. "223 The Court thereby accepted the classification's
inability to serve the intended purpose in some instances, and thus
indicated its approval of a rather imperfect fit between the classification and the objective. In contrast, the Court in Virginia did not
focus on the needs of most women, as it assumed that most women
would not want to attend VMI. 224 Instead, the Court focused on
whether VMI could deny admission to those women "who have the
will and capacity" to satisfy VMI's rigorous requirements. 225 By
focusing on these women, the Court required the classification to
serve its objective in virtually every instance. 226
A similarly imprecise fit between means and ends was upheld in
Kahn v. Shevin, in which the Court upheld a $500 property tax
219. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 80-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
did not require a sufficiently tight fit between means and ends).
220. See id. at 69 (noting that Congress could have required an actual relationship between
the child and the citizen parent or exempted from the statutory requirements the parent and
child who had an established relationship).
221. Id. at 70.
222. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996).
223. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 70.
224. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 542.
225. Id.
226. This requirement prompted Justice Scalia's dissenting comment that "[t]here is simply
no support in our cases for the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates
to characteristics that hold true in every instance." Id. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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benefit for widows, but not for widowers. 227 The Court claimed that
the question was not whether the "[l)egislature could have drafted
the statute differently, so that its purpose would have been
accomplished more precisely."228 Instead, the Court alleged that the
State was not required to draw precise lines for taxation schemes. 229
However, the imprecision of the admissions policy in Virginia, as
demonstrated by its exclusion of those women who could succeed at
VMI, contributed to its invalidation. 23°Furthermore, the sex-neutral
alternatives available to address the problem in Kahn, such as the
.inclusion of a financial means test that would exclude those widows
who did not need the tax exemption, 231 also establishes that the sex
classification was not essential to achieving the State's objective.
The Court also placed its imprimatur on a loose fit between
means and ends in Rostker v. Goldberg, in which it upheld a maleonly draft registration because only men were permitted to serve in
combat, and the purpose of registration was to develop a pool of
individuals who could serve as combat troops. 232 Even if the Court
believed that deference to the military in determining that women
could not serve in combat was appropriate, 233 combat-ineligible
men were required to register as well, 234 disproving that combat
eligibility was essential for an individual to be included in the draft.
Furthermore, the military includes countless noncombat positions
227. 416 u.s. 351, 352, 355-56 (1974).
228. Id. at 356 n.10.
229. See id. at 355, 356 n.10.
230. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 541-42.
231. See Kahn, 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contending that a "financially
independent heiress" would qualify for the exemption and that the State had not explained
"why inclusion of widows of substantial economic means was necessary to advance the State's
interest in ameliorating the effects of past economic discrimination against women").
232. 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981). Although some have argued that the Court did not state the
intermediate scrutiny standard in Rostker, see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 727, the
Court cited cases such as Craig v. Boren in reaching this decision and thereby made clear that
it applied intermediate scrutiny in Rostker. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 79.
233. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 735 & n.101 ("Of course, the assumption that women
cannot serve in combat is itself open to serious question and can be challenged as being based
in stereotypes."); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture,
Courts, and Feminism, in MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 530 (John H. Garvey
& T. Alexander Aleinikoff eds., 3d ed. 1994) (noting that some feminists felt that arguing for
the unconstitutionality of a male-only draft was important, while others felt that this position
would betray women and support what is "least acceptable about the male world").
234. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1573 (2d ed. 1988).
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for which women could be drafted. 235 Therefore, the distinction
between men and women in registration certainly was not necessary
to achieve the government's interest in raising troops for combat,
despite the Court's holding that the classification was "closely
related to Congress' purpose in authorizing registration."236 Not
surprisingly, the tenuous fit between the purpose of registration and
the exclusion of women from registration that the Court approved
inRostker provoked substantial criticism237 and vigorous dissents. 238
Although some contend that this decision has been dismissed as
limited in application because of the Court's special deference in
military cases, 239 the Court undoubtedly permitted a much looser fit
between the sex classification and its objective than was required in
either Virginia or Hogan. 240
Undoubtedly, many of the Court's opinions exist between these
two extremes. For example, in Craig v. Boren, the Court rejected a
sex-age differential for the sale of beer because the State failed to
present evidence that sex represented a "legitimate, accurate
proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving."241 Even if the
State could have demonstrated a closer correlation between the
age-sex differential and its laws regulating drinking, a sex
classification would not be necessary to address traffic safety
because a law prohibiting both sexes from drinking until a certain
age would address the State's concerns just as effectively. The
Court's examination of the State's evidence on the age-sex differential suggests that it would have found the sex classification
acceptable if the "gender-based distinction closely serve[d] to
235. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 101 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236. !d. at 79 (majority opinion).
237. See TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1572-74; Williams, supra note 233, at 531.
238. See Rostker, 453 U.S. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The Court today places its
imprimatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions of 'ancient canards about
the proper role of women.'"); id. at 83 (White, J., dissenting) ("I perceive little, if any,
indication that Congress itself concluded that every position in the military, no matter how
far removed from combat, must be filled with combat-ready men. Common sense and
experience in recent wars, where women volunteers were employed in substantial numbers,
belie this view of reality.").
239. See TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1573.
240. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 573 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Rostker as one of several cases in which the Court permitted a looser fit than required in
Virginia).

241. 429

u.s. 190, 204 (1976).
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achieve that objective,"242 rather than only permitting the classification if it was necessary to achieve the objective.
The disparate interpretations of intermediate scrutiny render it
ineffective as a constitutional framework because its requirements
have become unreliable and inconsistent. Determining what
constitutes a substantial relationship between a classification and
an objective invites a wide variety of opinions. Justice Rehnquist
correctly foreshadowed these concerns with intermediate scrutiny
in Craig v. Boren, in which he criticized the majority for adopting it
by asking: "How is [the Court] to determine whether a particular
law is 'substantially' related to the achievement of [its] ... objective,
rather than related in some other way to its achievement?"243 He
wisely argued that the "phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic
as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to
particular types of legislation."244 Unlike strict scrutiny, under
which very little is upheld, and rational basis, under which most
things pass constitutional muster, 245 intermediate scrutiny currently
is sufficiently indeterminate that the only thing consistent about it
is that it is inconsistently interpreted and applied. 246
Intermediate scrutiny's indeterminacy has also been repeatedly
acknowledged by scholars, who contend that it represents no more
than "ad hoc judgments based upon Justices' perceptions of the
gender classification at issue in each case."247 Kathleen Sullivan
colorfully captures intermediate scrutiny's indeterminacy in this
way: "No amount ofbureaucratic lingo in the formulas ofintermedi242. I d. at 200.
243. Id. at 221 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
244. Id.
245. DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION'S
THIRD CENTURY 292 (2d ed. 1998).
246. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 647 ("[l)t is argued that in some cases
intermediate scrutiny is applied in a very deferential manner that is essentially rational basis
review, while in other cases intermediate scrutiny seems indistinguishable from strict
scrutiny.").
24 7. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834; see George C. ffiavac, Interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause: A Constitutional Shell Game, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1349, 1375
(1993) ("The intermediate-scrutiny test ... is a much more malleable test that permits judges'
subjective preferences to come into play."); Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way:
Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 325 (1998) ("[T)he
Court's use of intermediate scrutiny makes it vulnerable to charges of ad hoc
decisionmaking. ").
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ate scrutiny ... can wholly dispel that Lochnerian feeling one can get
from intermediate scrutiny's shifting bottom line."248 The indeterminacy and subjectivity of intermediate scrutiny is reflected in the
wide spectrum of criticisms of this standard. Although some
constitutional frameworks are consistently criticized as too strict or
too lenient, intermediate scrutiny is criticized for being both. On the
one hand, some contend that intermediate scrutiny is a rather
permissive standard that is no different than rational basis
review; 249 on the other hand, some contend that the Court has
applied intermediate scrutiny in ways that make it virtually
indistinguishable from strict scrutiny. 250 Thus, while the Supreme
Court has been applying intermediate scrutiny for more than thirty
years, "the Court has always been much less clear about what that
standard allows and what it prohibits."251

C. The Implications of the Court's Disparate Interpretations of
Intermediate Scrutiny for Single-Sex Public Schools
The indeterminacy of intermediate scrutiny could result in
several potential negative outcomes for single-sex public schools.
Courts considering the range of interpretations of the substantial
relationship test could apply different requirements for how tight
the means and ends must be when deciding the constitutionality of
single-sex schools, and thus reach different outcomes on the
constitutionality of similar single-sex schools. 252 The disparate
interpretations of intermediate scrutiny could also result in courts
248. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 301 (1992).
249. See Deutsch, supra note 175, at 221; Hlavac, supra note 247, at 1376.
250. See Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument for Applying Strict
Scrutiny to Gender Classifications, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 957-58 (1996); Sunstein,
supra note 15, at 75.
251. Hasday, supra note 161, at 756; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834
(arguing that "the meaning of this test is less than clear").
252. For example, courts could reach different outcomes in adjudicating the
constitutionality of single-sex schools because, while a solitary single-sex school may serve the
needs and interests of most members of one sex, many students of the other sex may share
those same needs and interests. Under Virginia and Hogan, the needs and interests of the
excluded sex would trump the needs and interests ofthe majority, while under Nguyen, Kahn,
and Rostker the classification's inability to serve its objective all of the time would not be
dispositive.
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adopting either a too demanding or too permissive interpretation of
intermediate scrutiny for single-sex schools. If courts applied the
most demanding interpretation of intermediate scrutiny from
Virginia to all single-sex schools, courts could chill the development
of single-sex schools because establishing that single-sex education
is necessary to improve student outcomes would be difficult. 253 This
would be undesirable, given the considerable success of some singlesex schools254 and the need for educational reforms. 255
Alternatively, a very permissive interpretation of intermediate
scrutiny would fail to identify the potential harms that could exist
in a single-sex school, just as lower courts applying intermediate
scrutiny have sometimes failed to emphasize sufficiently the
substantial harms of sex discrimination. 256 The indeterminate
nature of intermediate scrutiny leaves courts "a lot more room to
import their own prejudices and biases in determining the existence
of a relationship and the importance of the state interest
involved."257 A permissive standard may also not require a sufficiently persuasive justification for denying a single-sex school to one
sex, thereby permitting educators to focus on one sex while neglecting the needs of the other with impunity.
The possible application of disparate interpretations may also
discourage experimentation with single-sex schools, as educators
remain in the dark about their constitutional obligations for opening
such schools. 258 Few school districts may be willing to undertake the

253. If this were to occur, Justice Scalia's prediction that the Court's opinion in Virginia
left no constitutional room for such schools would be proven correct. See United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. See supra notes 127-32, 136-38, 145-46 and accompanying text.
255. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEp'T OF EDUC., OVERVIEW AND INVENTORY
OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000, at 1-2 (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/
pass2005/2003020.pdf (discussing the events that have highlighted the need for education
reform within the United States).
256. See Elizabeth Schneider, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law Sch., Panel Discussion at
the Washington College of Law of American University (Apr. 8, 1996), in Centennial Panel:
Two Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: Evaluating Equal Protection for Women, 6 AM. U. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 24 (1997) [hereinafter Centennial Panel].
257. Deborah Brake, Senior Counsel, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., Panel Discussion at the
Washington College of Law of American University (Apr. 8, 1996), in Centennial Panel, supra
note 256, at 22.
258. See Brake, supra note 250, at 958; Sunstein, supra note 15, at 76; Wexler, supra note
247, at 325, 341.
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risks of litigation involved in opening a single-sex school. 259 The
small (but growing) number of single-sex schools may reflect the
ambiguity of legal obligations in this area, rather than a lack of
demand for such schools.
These concerns demonstrate that intermediate scrutiny's current
formulation is inadequate to achieve optimal results for single-sex
public schools. Before presenting a proposal to address these
concerns, this Article examines how other scholars have proposed
applying the Constitution to single-sex public schools. Their
theories, and why those theories alone are unpersuasive or insufficient to address these concerns, are presented in the next Part.
Ill. SCHOLARLY INTERPRETATIONS OF INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
AND WHY THEY SHOULD BE REJECTED IN THEIR CURRENT
FORMULATIONS TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SINGLE-SEX PuBLIC SCHOOLS

Scholars typically tum to two sex equity theories when assessing
whether single-sex public elementary and secondary schools are
constitutional: formal equality and antisubordination. 260 This Part
identifies some of the weaknesses of these two theories and argues
that they should not be used to determine the constitutionality of
single-sex public schools.

259. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 597 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
costs of litigating the constitutionality of a single-sex education program, and the risks of
ultimately losing that litigation, are simply too high to be embraced by public officials."); Tod
Christopher Gurney, Comment, The Aftermath ofthe Virginia Military Institute Decision: Will
Single-Gender Education Survive?, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1183, 1221-22 (1998) (arguing
that in Virginia, the Court "failed to answer important questions which need to be answered
in order to give school officials guidance when implementing single-gender schools").
260. See Minow, supra note 1, at 818 (noting that the debates over single-sex schools
"reflect the debates over whether gender equality calls for treating males and females the
same, or instead attending to differences between them"). No single article can address every
theory presented in the existing literature on single-sex schools. In addition, some of the
articles defy existing categories. This Article seeks to address the two most common theories
underlying scholarship about the constitutionality of single-sex schools and explain why these
theories are ineffective approaches to single-sex public schools.
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A. Formal Equality
The theory of formal equality requires similar treatment for
similarly situated individuals. 261 In applying formal equality to
single-sex public schools, some argue that single-sex schools are
unconstitutional because they are inherently unequal. 262 Often,
these arguments focus on the history of sex-segregated schools in
the United States, arguing, for example, that "in United States
education, separate has never been equal. From the first PublicFree Schools to the Citadel, single-sex male schools have had more
money, more resources and more status than single-sex female
schools."263 Others contend that single-sex schools are unconstitutional under the standard announced in Virginia because single-sex
educational environments perpetuate sex-based stereotypes and
roles, and "can reinforce antagonistic feelings toward the opposite
sex."264 These arguments reflect a formal equality model because
equality of the sexes, in terms of opportunities and the roles that
students occupy, remains the central litmus test for the constitutionality of single-sex schools. 265
Although some who would hold single-sex public schools unconstitutional rely on a formal equality model, many who believe that
some room remains for constitutional single-sex schools also
embrace this model. For instance, some scholars contend that two
equal single-sex schools, one for each sex, will be required or will
easily be upheld as constitutional. 266 Although this view lacks
261. See KATHARINE T. BARTLETI' ET AL., GENDER AND LAW: THEORY, DOCTRlNE,
COMMENTARY 117 (3d ed. 2002); Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to
Professor Westen, 81 MICH. L. REV. 575, 588 (1983). Depending on the theory's formulation,
it may require similar treatment between individuals or groups. See BARTLETI ET AL., supra,
at 117.
262. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 2; Johnson, supra note 79, at 88; Lucille M. Ponte,
United States v. Virginia: Reinforcing Archaic Stereotypes About Women in the Military Under
the Flawed Guise of Educational Diversity, 7 HAsTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 68 (1996).
263. Campbell & Wahl, supra note 159, at 309 (footnote omitted); see also Levit, supra note
60, at 526 ("At this juncture, state-sponsored sex exclusivity is unlikely to vest segregation
with new meaning. Sex segregation with connotations of inequality is of too recent
vintage-indeed, it never left us.").
264. Levit, supra note 60, at 521; see also Johnson, supra note 79, at 87.
265. See BARTLETI' ET AL., supra note 261, at 117.
266. See Michael Heise, Are Single-Sex Schools Inherently Unequal?, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1219, 1244 (2004); William Henry Hurd, Gone with the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of
Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'y 27, 49 (1997); Gary J. Simson,
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precedential value, some support for it is found in the Supreme
Court's equally divided decision in 1977 in Vorchheimer v. School
District of Philadelphia, which affirmed without an opinion a
decision that upheld the constitutionality of two comparable singlesex high schools at which attendance was voluntary in a district of
coeducational schools. 267
Examination of each of these formal equality arguments reveals
substantial weaknesses. Although some contend that single-sex
schools are inherently unequal, promote stereotyping, and reinforce
antagonistic feelings between the sexes, coeducation also does not
necessarily ensure equal opportunity for both sexes or prevent the
stereotyping of either sex. 268 Research reveals that both single-sex
and coeducational schools can stereotype women or promote their
inferiority. 269 The history of coeducational and single-sex schools
demonstrates that "[s]ome of the same mechanisms of inferiority
can function in both sex-segregated and coeducational public
schools."27° For example, both coeducational schools and sexsegregated schools historically steered women toward marriage and
motherhood, or toward low-paying jobs that limited their employment opportunities. 271 In fact, "the history of coeducational public
education vividly illustrates that this kind of role confinement can
flourish even in schools where female and male students officially
have access to the same resources and the same curriculum. "272
The history of education in this country suggests that how the
school is operated, rather than the sex of the students, determines
whether a single-sex or coeducational school reinforces stereotypes
or subordinates women. 273 Indeed, "the historical record reveals that
Separate but Equal and Single-Sex Schools, 90 CORNELLL. REV. 443,451 (2005); Tara Boland,
Comment, Single-Sex Public Education: Equality Versus Choice, 1 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 154, 171
(1998).
267. Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 532 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1976), affd by an
equally divided court per curiam, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). As an opinion by an equally divided
court, this opinion lacks precedential value. See Ohio ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263,26364 (1960).
268. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 758.
269. See AM. Ass'N OF UNIV. WOMEN, supra note 70, at 3; Hasday, supra note 161, at 758.
270. Hasday, supra note 161, at 758.
271. See id. at 793.
272. ld. at 794.
273. See Campbell & Wahl, supra note 159, at 305 ("[T]he issue of gender difference in
learning outcomes appears more as a question of classroom treatments and teacher expertise
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differences of form like that between sex-segregated and
coeducational public education can actually prove relatively
unimportant in terms of their substantive impact on women's
status."274 Research on single-sex public schools in the last decade
confirms the historical experience that the operation of the school,
not the sex of the students, determines how both sexes are
treated. 275 For instance, the 2001 California pilot study of public
single-sex academies quotes one expert as saying that "[s]ex
segregated education can be used for emancipation or oppression. As
a method, it does not guarantee an outcome. The intentions, the
understanding of people and their gender, the pedagogical attitudes
and practices, are crucial, as in all pedagogical work."276 Therefore,
in either a single-sex or coeducational environment, the risk of
stereotyping exists.
Because pedagogical attitudes and practices within a school shape
its outcomes, single-sex public schools that adopt a comprehensive
approach to gender equity that includes efforts to uncover and
debunk stereotyping, and to encourage positive perceptions about
the excluded sex, should be able to effectively address the inequality
and stereotyping that exists in some single-sex schools. 277 Similarly,
the suggestion that sex segregation reinforces negative feelings
between the sexes, as evidenced in part by negative comments about
the excluded sex by single-sex students, 278 can also be addressed
than of school gender context per se." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (footnote omitted)); Haag, supra note 79, at 648 ("The structure of single-sex
education, in other words, does not in and of itself ensure any particular outcomes, positive
or negative, because it has multiple inspirations and forms."); Morgan, supra note 178, at 98101 (arguing that single-sex schools are not inherently inferior and that the school's context
and operation must be examined to determine if it maintains the "dominance of a relatively
empowered group over a relatively subordinated group").
274. Hasday, supra note 161, at 794.
275. A 2002 book that includes a review of single-sex research by many experts in the field
concludes that, "perhaps most important, many of the authors find that both single-sex and
coeducational schooling can provide possibilities or constraints to students' achievement or
future opportunities, and these outcomes depend to a great degree on how these forms of
schooling are implemented." Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at 7.
276. DATNOW ET AL., supra note 100, at 74; see also Datnow & Hubbard, supra note 29, at
7 ("[N]umerous studies reported in this volume find that a commitment to gender equity must
be explicit in an organization's practices for it to be realized.").
277. See DATNOW ET AL., supra note 100, at 73-76 (recommending that single-sex schools
develop a strong theory of gender equity in their schools and work to dismantle stereotypes).
278. See Levit, supra note 60, at 521.
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through thoughtful pedagogical approaches that encourage
cooperation and respect, rather than antagonism, between the
sexes. Although one alternative to attempting to address these
concerns is to prohibit all single-sex public schools, that approach
would eliminate a potentially successful avenue for meeting the
educational needs of students. The wiser approach recognizes that,
on balance, the potential benefits of single-sex public schools
outweigh these concerns when single-sex schools are subject to a
constitutional standard that appropriately addresses the potential
harms that such schools may generate.
Having responded to those who would rely on a formal equality
model to prohibit all single-sex schools, the question remains
whether a formal equality model should be adopted under which
only two substantially equal single-sex public schools for each sex
should be permitted, and all disparities in single-sex schools would
be forbidden. The answer is that this approach would be too
restrictive to reach optimal results for single-sex schools. 279 AB
discussed further in Part IV.C, girls and boys have more similarities
than differences; however, this does not mean that all disparate
treatment in single-sex schools should be prohibited. Intermediate
scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools should leave room
for the development of persuasive research regarding when
disparate treatment would result in optimal outcomes for single-sex
public schools. 280
Furthermore, a formal equality theory that only permits two
substantially equal single-sex schools for each sex could also leave
in place some aspects of intermediate scrutiny that would undermine the development of single-sex public schools. For example,
courts considering the constitutionality of two single-sex public
schools would still have to decide whether such schools should be
permitted only if they are necessary to achieve their important
government interest, whether such schools only have to help the
government achieve its interest, or if some standard between these
two extremes should be applied. 281 Two substantially equal single279. A formal equality approach under which two substantially equal single-sex schools are
automatically upheld also should not be adopted because a minimal review of such schools
could cause courts to overlook stereotyping within these schools.
280. See infra Part IV.C.
281. See supra Part II.A-B (discussing the various Supreme Court interpretations of
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sex schools would also be in constitutional jeopardy if they did not
produce superior academic or other outcomes when compared to
coeducational schools with similar students because the Court often
invalidates sex classifications when a sex-neutral alternative would
serve the state's interest as well as or better than the sex classification.282 Single-sex schools presently appear to operate under the
shadow of this requirement, as evidenced by Rosemary Salomone's
research revealing that "[p]ublic pressure constantly weighs on
these schools to prove that they are academically 'better' than
coeducational schools serving similar students."283 Therefore, even
when two equal single-sex schools exist, courts could still require
these schools to outperform coeducational schools and shut them
down if they fail to do so. This pressure could have a chilling effect
on those considering opening such schools.
The problems that would remain if formal equality were adopted
as currently formulated and the weaknesses of this approach
warrant development of an alternative approach to govern the
constitutionality of single-sex schools. Before turning to the
approach proposed in this Article, the next section examines the
argument that the constitutionality of single-sex schools should be
assessed under an antisubordination theory of gender equity.

B. Antisubordination
An antisubordination theory of sex equity explicitly or implicitly
underlies many arguments both for and against the constitutionality of single-sex public schools. Antisubordination theories
"makeD the relevant inquiry not whether women are like, or unlike,
men, but whether a rule or practice serves to subordinate women
to men. "284 For example, some contend that single-sex schools
are unconstitutional because they harm girls or women and/or
perpetuate sex-based stereotypes about girls orwomen. 285 Similarly,
those who would uphold the constitutionality of single-sex schools
intermediate scrutiny).
282. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
283. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 9.
284. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 261, at 533.
285. See Cynthia F. Epstein, The Myths and Justifications of Sex Segregation in Higher
Education: VMI and The Citadel, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 101, 101 (1997).
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focus on the benefits of such schools for girls or women, often
distinguishing the new generation of single-sex schools from
prior generations. 286 These types of arguments rest on an antisubordination approach because they consider the harm or benefit
to girls or women as the central question of their analysis.
In applying an antisubordination approach, some would uphold
the constitutionality of a girls' single-sex school when the district
does not provide a boys' single-sex school but typically would not
permit a boys' single-sex school without a girls' single-sex school. 287
For example, Sharon Rush argues that "[v]oluntarily created allfemale schools should be constitutional because they promote the
equal citizenship of women without damaging the equal citizenship
stature of men."288 In contrast, she argues that "[m]ale-only state
schools create a hierarchy where men's citizenship stature is valued
more than women's citizenship rights."289
Similarly, Denise Morgan argues for an antisubordination
approach to single-sex public schools. 290 She contends that "shifting
the emphasis of [the intermediate scrutiny] test from fit to antisubordination focuses the judicial inquiry on the most important
question in sex equality jurisprudence: whether government use of
sex-based classifications works explicitly or implicitly to perpetuate
the hierarchy of men over women. "291 In applying this analysis,
Morgan's focus on potential harm to girls leads her to argue that a
boy denied admission to a single-sex school such as YWLS would not
have suffered a constitutional violation, and that "if none of the
other small high-quality co-educational middle schools in the school
district catered to his particular interests and needs, he and his
parents should work to convince other parents and teachers in the
school district to set up a school that does."292 However, she also
allows a single-sex school for boys to be found constitutional if it
does not adversely affect "the life chances of girls within the

286. See, e.g., Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex Education After VMI: The Case for Women's
Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 46, 59-62, 76-77 (1998).
287. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 759, 808-09; Nemko, supra note 286, at 67.
288. Rush, supra note 203, at 57-58.
289. Id. at 55.
290. Morgan, supra note 1, at 459.
291. Id.
292. Morgan, supra note 178, at 121.
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community."293 Others also support an antisubordination approach,
but for different reasons. 294
Scholars have pointed to statements by the Court that arguably
support the antisubordination approach. 295 An antisubordination
approach is consistent with some of the Court's existing case law
because it allows sex classifications to remedy harm to women. 296
Nevertheless, except when the Court finds that a sex classification
is addressing past discrimination, the Court is unlikely to adopt an
antisubordination approach because it has repeatedly eschewed
such asymmetrical approaches. The Court has required state actors
to "not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females. "297 Indeed, men who
sought the treatment or benefit accorded to women have brought
many of the Court's successful equal protection cases. 298 Ai3 this
Article seeks to propose an approach that the Court should adopt,
the unlikelihood that the Supreme Court would adopt an antisubordination approach is one strike against that approach.
Moreover, although the antisubordination approach advanced by
scholars such as Denise Morgan is among the more sophisticated
293. Morgan, supra note 1, at 457.
294. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 861-62, 869 (arguing that a rational relationship
test should apply to single-sex charter schools for minorities and girls, but a more demanding
standard should apply to single-sex schools for white boys, given the history of male
domination and white resistance to integrated schools); Hasday, supra note 161, at 756
(arguing that "the historical record of a practice can inform an investigation into whether,
when, and why that practice is consistent with women's 'full citizenship stature' or operates
to perpetuate their 'legal, social, and economic inferiority'").
295. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 756; Morgan, supra note 1, at 384.
296. The Court has repeatedly recognized this country's "long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,684 (1973); see also United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). Recognizing this history, the Court has upheld several
classifications that compensate women for past discrimination when such classifications could
not be adopted to benefit men. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317-20 (1977) (per
curiam) ("Reduction of the disparity in economic condition between men and women caused
by the long history of discrimination against women has been recognized as such an important
governmental objective."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 n.6 (1976) (noting that prior
decisions upheld gender classifications that remedied "disadvantageous conditions suffered
by women in economic and military life" (citing Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974))); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 731, 735-36;
NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834 (noting that laws favoring women are permitted
to make up for "past economic discrimination").
297. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (emphasis added).
298. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979).
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and persuasive approaches to assessing the constitutionality of
single-sex public schools, the Court, even if it were willing to adopt
this approach, would be ill-advised to do so for several reasons. The
primary reason is that the theory would not effectively address the
modern gender equity concerns facing our schools. It is undeniable
that intermediate scrutiny was adopted to address this country's
history of pernicious discrimination against women299 and that the
United States still has a substantial distance to go to overcome that
history. 300 Nevertheless, the present-day differences in achievement
outcomes for girls and boys that are described in Part I.A present a
complex picture that does not consistently favor either sex, and thus
defies categorical treatment, including categorical treatment that
focuses primarily on girls' educational needs. 301
The achievement data is clear-neither sex is ahead on all
measures and, along with lingering areas in which girls lag behind
boys, boys lag behind girls in several critical areas, such as
reading, writing, and college graduation rates. 302 Similarly, both
sexes may also experience adverse treatment, but in different
ways. 303 Undoubtedly, "[s]hort-term test scores and even longer term
college admissions may not capture what equality in education
should mean. "304 Yet, one should also be careful not to embrace a
constitutional theory that could encourage educators to neglect the
educational needs of boys when their performance is declining in
important areas. 305 Instead, one should try to make certain that
constitutional standards help the country ensure that all children

299. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531.
300. See, e.g., LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL: THE SHAMEFUL TRUTHABOUTWOMEN AND
JUSTICE IN AMERICA 407-13 (1996) (summarizing findings of sex discrimination in many
aspects of the criminal justice system); SADKER & SADKER, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing how
girls and boys are treated differently in the classroom); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
WOMEN'S EARNINGS: WORK PATTERNS PARTIALLY EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEN'S
AND WOMEN'S EARNINGS 9 (2003) (finding that "[a)fter accounting for factors affecting
earnings, women earned an average of [eighty) percent of what men eamed in 2000").
301. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
304. Minow, supra note 1, at 820.
305. Some, such as Christina Sommers and Judith Kleinfeld, contend that boys'
educational needs are not currently being met and are even being neglected. See KLEINFELD,
supra note 44, at 3-4; SOMMERS, supra note 43, at 14; see also Samuels, supra note 62, at 8.
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are given opportunities to reach their full intellectual potential. 306
For that reason, the constitutional theory applied to single-sex
schools should recognize the complexity of modern-day gender
disparities in education, and thus reject antisubordination's
exclusive focus on the effect that a single-sex school has on girls.
Fortunately, education is not a zero-sum game. Both boys and girls
may be provided single-sex opportunities without undermining the
opportunities provided to girls. 307
In addition to not effectively addressing modern-day gender
equity concerns, boys who are denied a single-sex school that is
provided to girls should not bear the responsibility for organizing
other students and parents to open a single-sex school because the
constitutional obligation to provide equal protection of the laws
rests on the state actor, typically the school district, rather than on
that state's citizens. The Court made this clear in Virginia when it
stated that when reviewing a sex classification, "[t]he burden of
justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State."308 The
antisubordination approach would lift this burden from the state
and place it on boys' shoulders, thereby placing a heavy burden on
boys to police their own rights, while the state focuses its energy
and resources on girls and any harm to them or their status.
Those who support an antisubordination approach may not be
concerned about placing such a heavy burden on boys because they
believe that men continue to hold more power and greater status in
society, and thus, boys should be able to convince a school board to
open a boys' school if they would benefit from one. 309 However, the
growing evidence that boys' educational needs are being overlooked
and that their achievement is laggin~ 10 suggests that boys in
elementary and secondary schools may not have the ability to
306. See Pinzler, supra note 81, at 788.
307. In addition to its other shortcomings, an antisubordination approach also fails to
recognize the humanity that boys share with the girls who are the focus of the approach.
However, "when we fail to 'treat likes alike'-we not only limit individual liberty and destroy
some social tradition, but we also, in effect, excommunicate: we declare some people to be not
worthy, and thus not 'like us,' and therefore not 'of us."' RoBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING
JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
150 (2003). Thus, antisubordination's excommunication of boys based on the hierarchy of men
over women should be avoided whenever possible.
308. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,533 (1996) (emphasis added).
309. See Morgan, supra note 178, at 121.
310. See supra notes 42-49, 61-67 and accompanying text.
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protect their interests as the antisubordination approach presumes.
Boys also sometimes may lack the influence to obtain a single-sex
school for themselves, and those in power may not be focused on
their interests. Consider the single-sex schools in New York City as
one example. Until2004, no boys' schools existed in New York City,
while the YWLS and its students have thrived since the school
opened in 1996. 311 While New York City now has two boys' schools
(and five girls' schools), boys' needs in New York City are unlikely
to be dramatically different now from their needs when YWLS
opened in 1996, and thus, those boys who would have benefited from
boys' schools during the interim did not have their needs met.
Therefore, even though men continue to hold substantially more
power and influence in American society, boys may sometimes lack
the ability, resources, or insight into the potential benefits of a
single-sex school for boys to convince a school board to open a school
for them, even when one would benefit them. 312
Although antisubordination seems to imply that women's
interests may not be adequately protected unless they are given
special solicitude, this may not remain true in many instances. 313 In
the realm of single-sex public schools, girls' interests may be
adequately championed by groups such as the Young Women's
Leadership Foundation, which has opened five single-sex schools for
girls and one for boys, 314 just as others have focused on and opened
schools for boys. 315 In the realm of influence to open single-sex
schools, neither sex appears to consistently lack the ability to obtain
311. See supra text accompanying notes 140-46.
312. The philanthropist and former journalist Ann Rubenstein Tisch initiated plans for the
YWLS in 1995, but did not open its doors until the fall of 1996. To launch the school, she hired
a legal team, obtained consulting services, and met with many top education officials and
parents. See SAWMONE, supra note 17, at 11-12; Riordan, supra note 51, at 24. Undoubtedly,
such a philanthropist and former journalist will have available more financial resources and
professional and personal connections to obtain results quickly than will most boys and their
families inN ew York City. The Court has already established that the rights protected by the
Equal Protection Clause are "rights which are personal and present." Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629, 634-35 (1950) (emphasis added). Therefore, even if a boy could work to develop such
a school, the delay in his enjoyment of his rights denies him the equal protection of the laws
today.
313. See FARBER ET AL., supra note 245, at 318 (discussing John Hart Ely's argument that
"women are today more than capable of being heard politically").
314. See Barak, supra note 1, at 33.
315. See Minow, supra note 1, at 817 (discussing how some advocate for girls' schools and
against boys' schools, while others advocate for boys' schools).
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a school that will benefit them. However, the excluded sex in
districts that lack a substantially equal school for their sex may lack
the means to obtain a school that would benefit them. 316
The proposal presented in the next Part seeks to address the
shortcomings of the formal equality and antisubordination approaches.317
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDEPOSTS FOR THE NEW GENERATION OF
PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

Two factors should serve as guideposts that direct how the
substantial relationship component of intermediate scrutiny should
be applied to single-sex public schools: whether attendance is
voluntary and whether substantially equal opportunities are given
to both sexes. These two characteristics can be used to divide singlesex public schools into two categories that present distinct potential
risks and benefits, and thus warrant different constitutional
requirements. lfboth voluntary attendance and substantially equal
opportunities for both sexes are present, schools should be placed
into the dual, voluntary category. If either voluntary attendance or
substantially equal opportunities is absent, single-sex schools
should be placed into the solitary or involuntary category. The
substantial relationship test should be calibrated to be more
demanding when assessing solitary or involuntary schools and less
demanding when assessing dual, voluntary schools.
This proposal's details are set forth below. Par IV.A sets the stage
for modifying intermediate scrutiny by analyzing how the Supreme
Court recently modified its interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause in Grutter v. Bollinger. Part IV.B explains why the presence
of substantially equal opportunities and voluntary attendance
results in two distinct categories of single-sex public schools that
represent different potential harms. Part IV.C proposes how these
two factors should be analyzed and how the substantial relationship
316. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
317. In taking this position, this Article does not suggest that antisubordination is an
approach that should not be adopted generally. Instead, this Article argues that
antisubordination would not result in optimal outcomes if applied to single-sex public schools
for the reasons outlined in Part III.B. However, an antisubordination approach may produce
the best possible results in other areas.
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requirement should be calibrated for each of the two categories of
schools. Finally, Part IV.D articulates how the deference given to
the two categories of schools should differ.
A. The Supreme Court's Modification of Equal Protection in
Grutter v. Bollinger

In analyzing the threshold question of whether intermediate
scrutiny should be modified when applied to single-sex public
schools, examining how the Supreme Court recently modified its
equal protection doctrine in Grutter v. Bollinger is helpful. In
Grutter, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the University of
Michigan Law School's admissions policy that sought to achieve
diversity by considering an applicant's race as one factor among
many admission factors. 318 Although the Court required a government actor seeking to remedy past discrimination to present
evidence of discrimination in the geographic area in which the
remedy is sought, 319 the Court in Grutter did not limit its consideration of evidence of the benefits of diversity to what happened at the
law school. Instead, the Court briefly considered evidence from the
law school itself and ultimately relied heavily on evidence from
numerous amici, including General Motors, 3M, and high-ranking
military officers, who all presented arguments regarding the
importance of diversity in U.S. businesses and the military. 320 This
modification appropriately customized strict scrutiny's application
to diversity because the value of diversity is not limited to the
particular institution before the Court, or even to educational
institutions generally, but instead extends beyond educational
institutions to the occupations and society for which students are
prepared and trained. 321
318. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
319. See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504-05 (1989).
320. See Grutter, 529 U.S. at 330-31. In Bakke, Justice Powell also relied on evidence from
Harvard University to establish the nature of diversity that he found sufficiently compelling
to support consideration of race at the Medical School of the University of California at Davis.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,316-17 (1978).
321. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331-32; see also Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity
as a Compelling Interest in Higher Education, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1357, 1363 (1996) ("[T]he
Court's present refusal to rely on evidentiary findings drawn from other jurisdictions is
inappropriate in a case concerning diversity in higher education." (footnote omitted)).

2006]

PUBLIC SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLS

2013

The Court also deferred to the law school's educationaljudgments
in determining whether diversity was a compelling interest. 322 The
Court explained that this deference was appropriate in light of past
decisions that gave "deference to a university's academic decisions,
within constitutionally prescribed limits."323 Such deference is
noticeably absent from cases in which the Court considered raceconscious programs adopted by such important representative
bodies as Congress or state and local legislatures. 324 The Court has
also modified its constitutional framework in other contexts. 325 In
short, modifying a constitutional standard is permissible and may
more effectively protect the constitutional rights at stake. 326

B. Constitutional Guideposts that Determine the Nature of the
Potential Harm Created by Single-Sex Public Schools: Voluntary
Attendance and Substantially Equal Opportunities for Both Sexes
The Supreme Court astutely observed in Jenness v. Fortson that
"[s]ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things
that are different as though they were exactly alike."327 This
principle holds true in considering not only how governments should
treat people, but also how courts and educators should view the

322. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
323. Id.
324. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 238 (1995); Croson, 488
U.S. at 498-501.
325. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665-66 (1995) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of student-athletes against a Fourth Amendment challenge and
explaining that a public school may exercise considerable control over public schoolchildren
even though the same degree of control cannot be constitutionally exercised over free adults);
see also James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1346-69
(2000) (analyzing how the Supreme Court has tailored schoolchildren's constitutional search,
due process, and speech rights "to fit the school context").
326. Some might contend that the Court specifically rejected any modification of
intermediate scrutiny in Hogan. In that case, Justice O'Connor noted that Justice Powell
argued in dissent that "a less rigorous test should apply because Hogan does not advance a
'serious equal protection claim."' Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 n.9
(1982) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting)). The prior discussion of the
inconsistencies in the Court's intermediate scrutiny cases demonstrates that the Court's
statement that its analysis of intermediate scrutiny remains the same is inaccurate. See supra
notes 178-242 and accompanying text.
327. 403 u.s. 431, 442 (1971).
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constitutional doctrines and tests that the Court has developed in
applying the Equal Protection Clause. 328
As noted in the Introduction, the Supreme Court systematized its
application of strict scrutiny in United States v. Paradise, in which
the Court listed several factors that guide strict scrutiny's narrow
tailoring inquiry. 329 Similarly, this Article seeks to systematize how
intermediate scrutiny's application of the substantial relationship
test to single-sex public schools takes "relevant differences into
account. "330 The proposal in this Article modifies the substantial
relationship test because the most difficult question in assessing the
constitutionality of single-sex public schools will depend upon how
the Court applies the often difficult and opaque substantial
relationship test. 331
The substantial relationship component of the intermediate
scrutiny test represents the most challenging inquiry in any
analysis of whether a sex classification is constitutional. 332 The
Court itself has admitted in a plurality opinion that "[t]he question
whether a statute is substantially related to its asserted goals is at
best an opaque one. "333 The difficulty of applying the substantial
relationship test is particularly troubling because the fit between
means and ends is also the most important distinction between
intermediate scrutiny and the rational basis standard. 334 Therefore,
328. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) ("Context matters when
reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."); see also THE
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES: A JOINT STATEMENT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW SCHOLARS 23 (2003) (arguing that differences in the settings and
interests advanced in elementary and secondary education may "weigh against a reliance on
Grutter and Gratz [v. Bollinger]" in determining whether other interests should be considered
sufficiently compelling to support a racial classification).
329. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987) (noting that when the Court
determines if a program is narrowly tailored, the Court examines "several factors").
330. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted).
331. See Willinger, supra note 37, at 277-78 (arguing that while a number of governmental
interests exist that may be sufficiently important to support single-sex education, the "very
difficult" question is whether single-sex education is substantially related to achieving those
interests). But see Morgan, supra note 1, at 418-19 ("The evolution of traditional justifications
for single-sex education makes it likely that many of the single-sex public schools that have
been established in recent years will survive the fit element of intermediate scrutiny."
(footnote omitted)).
332. See Brake, supra note 257, at 14.
333. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 474 n.10 (1981) (plurality opinion).
334. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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a failure to apply this test properly may result in intermediate
scrutiny failing to protect adequately against sex discrimination by
not requiring a sufficiently tight fit between means and ends.
Single-sex public elementary and secondary schools involve two
unique characteristics that determine the nature of the potential
harm created by single-sex schools, and these characteristics should
guide the application of the substantial relationship component of
intermediate scrutiny. These characteristics not only distinguish
some single-sex schools from other sex classifications, but their
presence or absence also affects the risk that single-sex schools will
harm students, the burden that single-sex schools may impose on
individuals, and the need for judicial skepticism of single-sex
schools. Consistent analysis of these factors will appropriately
calibrate the rigor with which the substantial relationship test is
applied to the potential harms and risks of single-sex public schools.
The first factor is whether the school district provides substantially equal opportunities to both sexes. If the district provides such
opportunities, the absence of a denial of an opportunity or benefit to
one sex should serve as a guidepost that distinguishes some singlesex schools from others. In identifying this as an important factor
that should drive the constitutional analysis of single-sex schools,
remembering that intermediate scrutiny is designed to review state
action that grants an opportunity or benefit to only one sex, or that
imposes a burden on only one sex, is important. 335 For example, the
Court in Virginia stated that "the Court ... has carefully inspected
official action that closes a door or denies opportunity to women (or
to men)."336 The Court has explained that it is "[l]egislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the basis of gender
335. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (accepting only male students
at VMI, a state school); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981) (statute giving
husband, but not wife, "the unilateral right to dispose of [joint marital property] without his
spouse's consent"); Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147 (1980) (statute
limiting situations in which a husband, but not a wife, may collect death benefits after the
other spouse's death); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (statute requiring husbands, but
not wives, to make alimony payments); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204 (1977)
(considering disparate Social Security survivors' benefits for widows and widowers); Stanton
v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 8 (1975) (statute "specifying for males a greater age of majority than
it specifies for females"); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 637-38 (1975) (Social
Security Act provision granting survivors' benefits to a deceased man's wife and children, but
only to a deceased woman's children).
336. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532 (emphasis added).
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[that] carry the inherent risk of reinforcing stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection. "337
Although all single-sex schools classify students on the basis of
sex, some single-sex schools do not involve the denial of an opportunity or benefit to one sex. Instead, each sex may receive the same or
substantially equal benefits. This occurs in dual academies that
provide a single-sex school for each sex with similar curricula,
teaching methods, materials, and sometimes even the same teachers
and facilities, 338 as well as in some pairs of single-sex schools that
educators design to provide both sexes similar educational opportunities. 339 In these circumstances, the state has adopted a sex
classification by separating boys and girls on the basis of sex, but it
has not denied either sex a benefit or an opportunity. Such a
separation should remain subject to intermediate scrutiny, 340 but
the absence of a denial of a benefit or opportunity to one sex
warrants modification of the intermediate scrutiny standard
because this subset of single-sex schools generally places less of a
burden on either sex than when one sex is excluded from certain
benefits. Substantially equal opportunities for each sex reduce the
likelihood that either sex is harmed because disparate treatment is
minimized. Minimizing disparate treatment between girls and boys
is appropriate because girls and boys are typically similarly
situated. 341 Thus, the provision of substantially equal opportunities
helps to ensure that educators are not shortchanging the needs of
either girls or boys, and such single-sex schools should be subject to
a less demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test.
In contrast, when a student is denied a single-sex school, the
student will miss out on a benefit that the school would have
provided her or him. As described in Part I.C, some single-sex public
schools, such as YWLS in Harlem, which provides its students
337. Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (emphasis added).
338. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 227-28.
339. See id. at 228-32 (describing the California pilot study that focused on giving students
equal resources).
340. But see Simson, supra note 266, at 451 (arguing that when two coordinate single-sex
schools are provided, "[a]lthough the state is obviously taking sex into account in establishing
such schools, it is not treating anyone any better or worse on the basis of sex. No sex
classification exists, and therefore the higher level of scrutiny triggered by sex classifications
does not come into play.").
341. See Campbell & Wahl, supra note 159, at 306-07.
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"intense and personalized attention," are providing valuable and
unique opportunities to their students and achieving substantial
success. 342 Students excluded from these opportunities are being
denied the potential to reap these important benefits. This denial
should influence the constitutional analysis of the schools.
The second factor is whether attendance at a single-sex school is
voluntary. 343 Voluntary schools are less likely to inflict harm on
students of either sex for two reasons. First, students who do not
attend the school can obtain substantially equal benefits in a
coeducational school. Second, students who attend the school are not
being forced to attend and could entirely avoid the sex classification.
The choice to attend the school reduces the likelihood that the
students are harmed by the school because any perceived harm to,
or inferior opportunities for, students in single-sex schools will
cause parents and students to select a different school. For this
choice to be exercised in an informed manner, parents and students
will have to be given information about their available options,
including the potential advantages and disadvantages of these
options. Voluntary attendance should help to assure educators and
courts that those students who choose to attend the single-sex
school, rather than a substantially equal coeducational school,
believe that the school's single-sex composition will help them
achieve their educational goals. 344 Therefore, voluntary attendance
at a single-sex school accomplishes some of the work that intermediate scrutiny was created to achieve. 345
342. See supra text accompanying notes 140-46.
343. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 391 ("Attendance is voluntary at all of these new [singlesex) schools."). For children in elementary and secondary schools, parents rather than the
students will typically be exercising the choice. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925) (affirming that the state cannot unreasonably interfere with "the liberty of
parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their
control"). However, this does not change the fact that those making the decision to attend the
school could choose otherwise.
344. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 16 (discussing why some parents chose to send their
daughters to YWLS).
345. The ability to exercise a choice to attend a single-sex school should also have a policing
effect on educators as they design single-sex public schools because parents and students who
identify any stereotyping or other harmful effects in single-sex schools will decide to attend
substantially equal coeducational schools. Certainly, parents and students should not be the
only policing mechanism because they may overlook sex discrimination or share educators'
stereotypes, or the school's harmful effects may only be evident over time. Thus, voluntary
single-sex public schools should remain subject to intermediate scrutiny, including an analysis
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On the other hand, involuntary attendance increases the risk of
harm to students. When students attend a single-sex school
involuntarily, the state may be forcing a sex classification on a
student that the student would rather avoid. In addition, an
involuntary classification also carries a greater risk of harm
because it could convey a negative message about the capacity of
the sex that is educated in the single-sex environment, namely that
those students can only succeed when the other sex is absent. 346
Therefore, whether attendance at the school is voluntary or
involuntary should influence the constitutional analysis of singlesex public schools.

C. How the Guideposts Should Modify the Substantial
Relationship Test Applied to Public Single-Sex Elementary and
Secondary Schools
Part C first explains how substantial equality and voluntary
attendance should be analyzed. This Article then uses these
guideposts to determine how the substantial relationship test
should be applied to single-sex public schools.
1. Analyzing Whether a Single-Sex School Provides
Substantially Equal Opportunities for Girls and Boys and
Whether Attendance Is Voluntary

To determine how the substantial relationship component of
intermediate scrutiny should be applied, a court should first assess
whether the district provides substantially equal single-sex schools
to both sexes and whether students attend the schools on a voluntary basis. 347 The answers to these two questions determine which
interpretation of the substantial relationship test should be applied.
Courts should apply a more demanding interpretation of the
of whether the schools promote stereotyping. However, voluntary attendance should be one
of the factors that guides the constitutional analysis of single-sex schools.
346. See Minow, supra note 1, at 822 (arguing that careful attention should be paid to the
voluntariness of single-sex education because it could "convey assumptions about the
vulnerability and incapacity of girls to compete fully with boys at least in the world as
currently constructed").
347. If courts adopt this approach, educators would also follow these steps. Because this
proposal is largely aimed at courts, this Article will speak of courts conducting the analysis.
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substantial relationship test when a school district provides a
solitary or involuntary single-sex school. Conversely, courts should
apply a less demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test when a school district provides dual, voluntary schools.
Courts should examine several factors to assess whether public
single-sex schools offer each sex substantially equal opportunities,
such as whether the schools serve similar grade levels and geographic areas. In addition, courts should assess whether the schools
offer similar opportunities and benefits, such as similar curricula,
resources, staffs, and teachers. 348 The Supreme Court's opinions in
cases such as United States v. Virginia and Sweatt v. Painter
provide thorough discussions of what must be equal for two schools
to be substantially equal. 349 For example, in holding that VMI and
VWIL were not substantially equal, 350 the Court approvingly quoted
the dissent of Judge Phillips of the Fourth Circuit, who had
compared VMI and VWIL to a paradigm that he contended "'could
survive equal protection scrutiny': single-sex schools with 'substantially comparable curricular and extra-curricular programs, funding,
physical plant, administration and support services, ... faculty[,] and
library resources. '"351
Creating and maintaining substantial equality in both tangible
and intangible ways may prove difficult for educators. As one
expert on single-sex schools has noted, "[s]chools differ from each
other in subtle and not so subtle ways that are not quantifiable,
from their curriculum to the instructional materials and approaches
used, to their educational philosophy, academic expectations,
teacher experience, and overall climate."352 Undoubtedly, the
substantial equality standard established in Virginia is a difficult
one; nevertheless, the Court's use of"substantial equality," rather
348. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving
Federal Financial Assistance, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276, 11,285 (proposed Mar. 9, 2004) (noting
items that must be similar for two schools to be considered substantially equal).
349. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547-51 (1996) (discussing the
constitutional requirements for an all-female parallel program to an all-male military
academy and Virginia's failure to meet these requirements); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629,
633-34 (1950) (finding no substantial equality between the University of Texas Law School
and the then newly-created Texas State University law school for African Americans).
350. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 554.
351. I d. at 54 7 n.17 (omission and alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Virginia,
44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting)).
352. SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 9.
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than perfect equality, suggests that it will permit limited differences
to exist between such schools, while still finding them to be
substantially equal. For example, the Brighter Choice Charter
Schools in Albany, New York, permit teachers to vary the pace at
which they teach girls and boys the same curriculum. 353 In addition
to allowing some tangible differences between single-sex schools for
each sex, courts should also have some tolerance for intangible
differences that are beyond educators' control, such as the success
of an alumnus that brings notoriety to a school. A greater harm
would be inflicted by ending the single-sex policy of one school that
differs in minor ways from its counterpart than would be gained by
the students who are denied those intangible benefits. 354
Courts and educators should be mindful not to transform a
standard that requires substantially equal single-sex schools into
one that requires identical single-sex schools. Elementary and
secondary schools typically will have more similarities than the
postsecondary institutions that the Court has previously compared,
353. ROSALIND BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS, SAME DIFFERENCE: How GENDER MYTHS ARE
HURTING OUR RELATIONSHIPS, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR JOBS 242, 244 (2004) (arguing that
"single-sex schools may create as many problems as they solve" and that single-sex schools
may result in an inferior education for girls, reinforce stereotypes, and leave sexism
unchallenged in boys' schools); see id. at 234. Currently, researchers debate whether biological
differences exist between the brains of the sexes and whether this impacts learning. Compare
LEONARD SAX, WHY GENDER MATTERS: WHAT PARENTS AND TEACHERS NEED To KNOW ABOUT
THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES 1-32 (2005) (arguing that significant biological
differences exist between girls and boys in how their brains and visual systems are organized,
how they learn, how they hear, and on other measures), and GURIAN ET AL., supra note 40,
at 35-38,44-52 (examining how biological dissimilarities influence learning at the elementary,
middle school, and high school levels), with BARNETT & RIVERS, supra, at 240 (arguing that
differences do not exist regarding how the sexes learn and noting that "[w)omen's ways of
knowing appear to be exactly like men's ways of knowing"). The resolution of this debate,
including whether this research should or should not influence how single-sex schools are
structured, is not necessary to advance the legal argument in this Article; therefore, an
examination of this debate and its ramifications is beyond the scope of this Article.
354. See Caplice, supra note 99, at 290 ("Single-sex educational environments are a large
part of educational reforms in urban areas and constitutional stumbling blocks placed in their
paths could be devastating. Undeniably, the need for successful educational reform at every
level of schooling is urgent.") Undoubtedly, the intangible and uncontrollable benefits in a
single-sex school for one sex could become so overwhelming that the schools no longer remain
substantially equal. For example, unique opportunities, such as the extensive alumni network
ofthe Philadelphia High School for Girls, see SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 30, could render
a new boys' high school in Philadelphia inferior to the girls' school. Nevertheless, this Article
cautions courts against finding inequality too quickly based on disparities that are beyond the
control of educators.
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which traditionally develop a unique faculty, reputation, ranking,
and alumni network. 355 Additionally, two elementary and secondary
public schools within a school district are more likely to be substantially equal in their curriculum today because the adoption of
statewide standards in recent years has increased the similarities
in curricular offerings among schools. 356
A court would then assess whether students attend the single-sex
school(s) on a voluntary basis. 357 Currently, no district exists that
has only single-sex public schools. However, this alone does not
ensure that students attend single-sex schools on a voluntary basis.
Instead, several factors should be evaluated to determine if students
voluntarily choose to attend a single-sex school. First, if a student
can only receive the educational curriculum, teaching methods,
resources, or other important educational benefits at the single-sex
school, students may have chosen to accept a single-sex environment to receive the unique educational opportunities, even though
the single-sex format is less than desirable. 358 For example, if a
single-sex school has the only specialized math and science or
foreign culture and language-focused curriculum in the school
district, a student may prefer a coeducational environment, but may
355. Most elementary and secondary schools will lack some of the characteristics that
postsecondary institutions possess, such as extensive alumni networks, research centers, or
prestige within the community. See Ryan, supra note 325, at 1380. In those instances when
single-sex schools possess some of these unique characteristics, such as the alumni network
of the Philadelphia High School for Girls, see SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 30, such benefits
should be considered when determining if two single-sex schools are substantially equal.
356. See, e.g., Douglas A. Archbald & Andrew C. Porter, Curriculum Control and Teachers'
Perceptions of Autonomy and Satisfaction, 16 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'y ANALYSIS 21, 21
(1994) (discussing how the development of statewide standards in the 1980s resulted in
"unprecedented assertion of state control over school and classroom curriculum decision
making," including the use of such means as "prescriptive curriculum policy"); Rodney T.
Ogawa et al., The Substantive and Symbolic Consequences of a District's Standards-Based
Curriculum, 40 AM. Enuc. RES. J. 147, 157 (2003) (discussing the use of a districtwide
curriculum).
357. Scholars and others have recommended that single-sex schools remain voluntary. See
Morgan, supra note 1, at 427; Pamela J. Smith, Looking Beyond Traditional Educational
Paradigms: When Old Victims Become New Victimizers, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 101, 170 n.268
(1999) (discussing Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson's proposal to allow public schools to offer
voluntary single-sex schools and classrooms); Sax, supra note 22, at 35.
358. A Third Circuit judge made a similar argument in his dissent from the opinion that
upheld two single-sex high schools in Philadelphia. See Vorchheimer v. Sch. Dist., 532 F.2d
880, 889 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), aft'd by an equally divided court per curiam,
430 u.s. 703 (1977).
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be unwilling to forego the specialized curriculum to avoid the singlesex environment. Consequently, at a minimum, for attendance to be
voluntary, the district must provide a coeducational school that is
substantially equal to the single-sex school, irrespective of the
students' sex. 359
Second, the context in which students and parents exercise choice
also determines whether attendance is voluntary. Educators, such
as teachers and administrators, may exert pressure on students and
parents to attend a single-sex school or fail to provide students and
parents the opportunity to decline to attend a single-sex school. 360
When students and parents are not provided the opportunity to
decline to attend a single-sex school, attendance is effectively
involuntary. 361
Finally, voluntariness often exists along a continuum, rather than
as a dichotomy. For example, if the district offers a coeducational
program that is quite similar, but not substantially equal, to a
single-sex program, attendance at the single-sex school is more
voluntary than attendance at a single-sex school in which a unique
program is offered. The substantial degree of voluntariness in
attending such a single-sex school would entitle the school to be
evaluated under the less demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test.

2. Dual, Voluntary Single-Sex Public Schools
If a school district offers substantially equal single-sex schools to
both sexes, and students attend the schools on a voluntary basis,
courts should apply a less demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test. 362 As noted above, voluntary attendance and
359. See Willinger, supra note 37, at 277 (noting that students have free choice between
schools when there are two comparable single-sex schools and a comparable coeducational
school).
360. See DATNOWET AL., supra note 100, at 33 (noting that the choice to attend some of the
single-sex schools in the California pilot student was "not a fully democratic choice for
students and parents").
361. See Justin Blum, Scores Soar at D. C. School with Same-Sex Classes, WASH. POST, June
27, 2002, at A1 (noting that in Washington, D.C., an elementary school split all of the classes
up by sex without informing the superintendent or anyone else). Courts should also be
mindful that involuntary assignment of students to single-sex schools violates the Equal
Educational Opportunities Act. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1703 (2000).
362. Cf Minow, supra note 1, at 822 ("Thus, single-sex education could be far more
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the provision of substantially equal opportunities for both sexes
likely renders the schools less harmful than other schools, and thus,
they should be subject to a less demanding constitutional threshold.
A district that offers dual, voluntary schools should have to
establish that the single-sex nature of the schools helps the district
achieve its educational goals. 363
The district also should be required to establish that dual,
voluntary single-sex schools are as effective as similarly situated
coeducational schools364 in achieving their objectives, after educators
are permitted a reasonable timeframe for understanding how best
to administer such schools. 365 When examining the outcomes of
single-sex schools, 366 courts should consider a variety of outcomes,
such as test scores, graduation rates, the attitudes of students
toward their studies, and students' career prospects. The Court in
Grutter recognized a variety of student learning outcomes as
important to its approval of the race-conscious admissions program
at the University of Michigan Law School, including upholding the
lower court's findings that the policy "promotes 'cross-racial understanding,' helps to break down racial stereotypes, and 'enables
[students] to better understand persons of different races.'"367 The
Court should follow a similar course in its approach to single-sex
schools by acknowledging that student learning may be improved in
a variety of ways in single-sex schools, such as by reducing the
defensible where offered on an entirely voluntary basis than where it is mandated by law. If
available on an entirely voluntary basis, single-sex education could well convey the social
message of expected excellence and invitation to full striving.").
363. See supra notes 218-40 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the Court
adopts this interpretation of the substantial relationship component of intermediate scrutiny).
364. When measuring the performance of dual, voluntary single-sex schools, or a solitary
or involuntary school, it is important that courts compare similarly situated schools. If singlesex schools accept students that were the lowest performers at coeducational schools, courts
should recognize that this difference will affect the academic and other outcomes that occur
at such schools.
365. Courts should permit educators a reasonable amount of time to determine how best
to administer single-sex public schools because single-sex public schools are relatively new
to the educational landscape, and educators will need time to understand how to harness the
benefits of the single-sex environment.
366. This examination ofthe outcomes from public single-sex schools agrees with Rosemary
Salomone's contention that the "'exceedingly persuasive justification' ... implicitly requires not
only a rationale based on students' needs but also some confirmation on the outputs end."
SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 188.
367. See Grutterv. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003) (alteration in original).
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perception that girls do not excel at math or that boys do not excel
at foreign languages, and that these benefits are also important for
the country's schoolchildren. 368
The requirement that single-sex schools should be as effective as
similarly situated coeducational schools in achieving their objectives
recognizes that any important objective for a single-sex school would
involve benefiting the students attending the school. Therefore,
evidence that the school is adversely affecting student outcomes
would undermine an argument that the school's existence is
substantially related to its objective ofbenefittng students. If singlesex schools are harming students, the costs of single-sex schools
become too great. 369
Some have suggested that single-sex schools must outperform
coeducational schools to be constitutional-that is, they must
produce superior academic or other outcomes. 370 Indeed, as noted
above, public pressure on single-sex schools to prove that they are
more effective than coeducational schools371 may reflect the
Court's presumption against sex classifications when other sexneutral alternatives are available. 372 In light of this presumption,
courts applying intermediate scrutiny to single-sex public schools
understandably could require single-sex schools to outperform
coeducational schools. However, ifcourts rendered single-sex schools
unconstitutional because coeducational schools would also serve the
school district's objective, courts would undermine the ability of
educators to experiment with single-sex schools, denying schoolchildren the substantial benefits of some single-sex public schools. 373
A legal requirement that single-sex schools must outperform
368. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text (discussing some of the benefits of
single-sex schools).
369. When applying this requirement, it is important to remember that those single-sex
schools that are developed to promote a diversity of educational options may have inferior
outcomes while still fulfilling their objective of giving students a choice in where they attend
school. Similarly, an educational experiment may be more likely to experience inferior
outcomes than single-sex schools that have been in operation for several years because
educators may need time to understand how to maximize the benefits of the single-sex
environment.
370. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 1, at 456.
371. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 9.
372. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 82-97, 127-32, 136-46 and accompanying text (discussing the research
on the benefits of single-sex schools and the success of some single-sex schools).
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coeducational schools would also eliminate the ability of parents and
students to choose the school that they believe will best serve their
needs. 374
Applying a less demanding interpretation of the substantial
relationship test to dual, voluntary schools does not remove these
schools from constitutional scrutiny. In addition to requiring a
school district to show that the single-sex nature of the schools helps
the district achieve its educational goals and that the schools are as
effective as coeducational schools, all single-sex schools should be
examined to determine if they are perpetuating stereotypes or the
inferiority of either sex. 375 The examination of dual, voluntary
schools for stereotyping recognizes that all sex classifications carry
the risk that the state's effort to develop educational programs has
relied on "overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females. "376 Stereotypes
harm both sexes 377 and may be based on mistaken assumptions
about those excluded from a school, such as the stereotypes about
women that led VMI to exclude them378 or assumptions about those
included in the school, such as the exclusion of men from MUW that
perpetuated the view that the nursing profession was solely for
women. 379
374. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 244.
375. See Hasday, supra note 161, at 808-09; Morgan, supra note 1, at 456-57 (arguing that
the all-male school proposed by the Detroit Board of Education was unconstitutional because
it perpetuated stereotypes about the place that men should occupy in society).
376. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
377. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 147, 150-52 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440
u.s. 268, 281-83 (1979).
378. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 540-45.
379. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982). In fact, the burden
on the sex included in a single-sex school could be so great that the school could be found
unconstitutional based on the potential harm to the included sex alone, even when no member
of the excluded sex alleged harm from the school. For example, vocational education had been
an area in which sex stereotyping was particularly rampant when Title IX was passed and
in which discrimination continues today. See NAT'L WOMEN'S LAw CTR., TITLE IX AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN VOCATIONAL AND TECHNICAL EDUCATION: A PROMISE STILL OWED TO THE
NATION'S YOUNG WOMEN 3 (2002); Carolyn E. Staton, Sex Discrimination in Public Education,
58 Miss. L.J. 323, 333 (1988). Therefore, even if Title IX did not forbid single-sex vocational
schools, a court could invalidate a single-sex vocational school because the risk of stereotyping
in such schools may be so high that such schools should not be permitted in light of the
continued sex-based disparities and discrimination in educational opportunities in this area.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(l) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in admissions
to vocational education programs).
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By recommending that courts examine all single-sex schools to
determine if they perpetuate stereotypes, the proposal advanced in
this Article recognizes that the risk of stereotyping remains real
today. The stereotyping described in Part I.C, which was uncovered
in the California schools that were carefully structured to provide
the same educational programs to boys and girls, 380 reveals that
providing similar resources or benefits to both sexes is no guarantee
that stereotyping will not exist. Jill Hasday astutely argues in her
article on single-sex schools that courts should make a thorough
"particularized investigation" of the operation of "separate but
equal" single-sex schools to determine whether they deny equal
citizenship status, rather than assuming that separate but equal
schools automatically satisfy a school district's obligation to provide
equal protection of the laws. 381 It is doubtful that anyone would
contend that the perpetuation of stereotypes is substantially related
to the achievement of an important state objective. 382 Hence, careful
attention and monitoring will be necessary to avoid stereotyping in
all single-sex schools. 383

3. Solitary or Involuntary Single-Sex Public Schools
A solitary or involuntary single-sex school should be subject to a
more demanding interpretation of the substantial relationship test
than should a dual, voluntary school because involuntary attendance or the denial of a single-sex school to one sex increases the
risk of harm to students, as noted in Part N.B. Given the potential
harms and burdens on students from solitary or involuntary single380. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
381. Hasday, supra note 161, at 808-09.
382. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 452 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("It is unlikely ... that any gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive
heightened scrutiny .... ").
383. The authors of the study of California's pilot program on single-sex schools
recommended a number of actions that educators could take to address stereotyping,
including making deliberate efforts to dismantle gender stereotypes and ensuring that a
strong theory of gender equity drives such schools. Such efforts could include statewide
guidance that provides local districts with information on issues of gender bias and financial
assistance for professional development regarding gender equity. DATNOW ET AL., supra note
100, at 6, 73-76; see Sax, supra note 22, at 48 (noting that "[p)rofessional development appears
to play a crucial role" in the success of single-sex education).
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sex schools, the school district should be required to demonstrate
that involuntary attendance or the exclusion of one sex is necessary
to achieve its objective, as the Court required the state to show
in Virginia and Hogan. 384 To make this showing, the school
district must demonstrate that the sex-neutral alternative of a
coeducational school, including a coeducational school that requires
some modification of its program, will not achieve the state's
objective. 385 If a coeducational school is equally effective at achieving
the objective, then the school district should be required to achieve
its objective in a coeducational school. Like dual, voluntary schools,
a solitary or involuntary school should also be examined to ensure
that it does not perpetuate stereotypes.
In addition, if the school district provides a solitary school, the
district should also be required to establish an exceedingly persuasive justification for its denial of a single-sex school to one sex.
Scholars and others have offered several reasons that they contend
should be sufficiently persuasive to justify a district's decision to
deny one sex a single-sex school, including inadequate demand. 386
For example, Justice Scalia noted in Virginia that the district court
had found that a VMI-type program in Virginia for women would
attract an insufficient number ofparticipants. 387
However, lack of demand should not serve as an exceedingly
persuasive justification for denying a single-sex school to one sex for
several reasons. Demand does not exist in a vacuum; instead,
opportunity and circumstances shape demand. For instance,
demand cannot be accurately assessed for a single-sex school that
has never been provided to the excluded sex, while the school
district or others have undertaken extensive recruitment efforts for
the included sex. 388 Disparities in interest under these circum
384. See supra Part II.A (discussing the requirements of Virginia and Hogan).
385. See Kovacic-Fleischer, supra note 203, at 883 (arguing that after Virginia, "courts
faced with gender equal protection challenges will need to consider whether institutions can
make changes, even in practices not intentionally discriminatory, before ruling that the
exclusion of one or the other gender is permissible").
386. See Hurd, supra note 266, at 35; Kimberly M. Schuld, Rethinking Educational Equity:
Sometimes, Different Can Be an Acceptable Substitute for Equal, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 461,
485-88.
387. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 578 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
388. At the elementary and secondary school levels, the Young Women's Leadership
Foundation, which founded YWLS, "is stimulating interest and supporting local efforts to
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stances may reflect the stimulation of interest in one sex. School
districts that maintain a single-sex school for only one sex may also
influence demand by discouraging the excluded sex from attending
such schools and directing them elsewhere. 389 Thus, any alleged lack
of demand among one sex should be examined very carefully to
ensure that it is not simply the result of the past denial of opportunity or of the school district or community members discouraging
demand among the excluded sex. Also, demand may increase as
single-sex opportunities are created, and thus, measuring the
demand of either sex before a single-sex school is offered may
generate inaccurate data. 390
Finally, the Court should adopt an approach to assessing the
validity of the lack of demand argument for single-sex schools that
is similar to its approach to such an argument in its race jurisprudence. The Court rejected an argument that insufficient demand
among African Americans for a law school justified Missouri's denial
of such a school to the petitioner in the 1938 decision of Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada. 391 Similarly, the Court should also reject a
lack of demand argument as an exceedingly persuasive justification

establish a national network of exemplary public girls' schools in other large cities."
SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 18. The first offspring, the Chicago Young Women's Leadership
School, opened in 2000 and is a charter school for middle and high school girls that was
designed by prominent female corporate leaders and attorneys. See id. The foundation has
opened five single-sex public schools for girls and one for boys. Barak, supra note 1, at 33. The
absence of boys' schools in Chicago does not mean that boys and their parents do not have an
interest in single-sex education in that city. Instead, it may merely reflect the foundation's
focus on girls in that city.
389. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 32,34-35 (describing how officials at Western High
School in Baltimore, Maryland, and Philadelphia High School for Girls have directed
interested boys to other schools).
390. See, e.g., SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 21 (stating that in New York, the demand to
attend the YWLS has "grown exponentially. For the 2002-3 year there were more than 550
applications for the 60 openings in the seventh grade and a waiting list of 1,200 for 3 ninthgrade slots."); Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 809 ("[T)he interest in single-sex education
continues to be high, especially within working-class, poor, and minority communities.");
Caplice, supra note 99, at 285 (arguing that "it could well be that there is substantial latent
demand for single-sex schools currently hidden by the unavailability of affordable single-sex
schools to serve that demand"); Morgan, supra note 1, at 389 (noting a recent "resurgence of
interest in single-sex schooling").
391. 305 u.s. 337, 350-51 (1938).
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for the denial of a single-sex school to one sex once a school district
provides that opportunity to the other sex. 392
In addition to rejecting lack of demand as a sufficient justification
for denying a single-sex school to one sex, some contend that
providing a single-sex school to one sex and the same benefits in a
coeducational school to the other sex should satisfy a school district's equal protection obligations. 393 For example, when school
board officials opened YWLS, they alleged that offering comparable science, math enrichment, and leadership programs in a
coeducational setting would ensure the school's constitutionality. 394
Others contend that a single-sex school for one sex increases the
options available for that sex without limiting the coeducational
options of the other sex. 395
On this question, the Court should also follow a course consistent
with past precedent on a statutory sex discrimination claim, which
held that the nondiscriminatory provision of some benefits does not
cure the discriminatory denial of other benefits. 396 Likewise, the
denial of a single-sex school to one sex should not be upheld solely
on the basis that the same educational programs and opportunities
provided in the single-sex school are provided in a coeducational
school. 397 The school's single-sex nature typically would benefit some
students of the excluded sex, 398 and thus, this denial should not be
permitted without an exceedingly persuasive justification for why
a single-sex school is not provided to the excluded sex.
ffitimately, a solitary single-sex public school should only be
permitted under limited circumstances for two reasons. First, equal
392. See Brake, supra note 257, at 21.
393. See SALOMONE, supra note 17, at 237 ("As long as the program has academic merit,
does not promote sex stereotypes or rely on 'overbroad generalizations' concerning the abilities
or preferences of girls or boys, and does not offer a 'unique' or 'extraordinary' opportunity that
is not available to the other sex in a 'substantially equal' setting, then it will pass
constitutional muster.").
394. See id. at 15.
395. Morgan, supra note 1, at 419.
396. Ariz. GoverningComm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1074, 1081 n.10 (1983) (holding that
an employer program that provided lower payments to women violated Title VII and stating
that "[a]n employer that offers one fringe benefit on a discriminatory basis cannot escape
liability because he also offers other benefits on a nondiscriminatory basis" (citing Miss. Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 n.8 (1982))).
397. See Pinzler, supra note 81, at 799.
398. See supra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
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protection of the laws is determined by what the state initially
chooses to provide-that is, the decision maker may either choose
not to provide particular benefits or to provide equal benefits to
those who are similarly situated. However, once the initial decision
is made to provide the benefits, the decision maker cannot deny
what it provides to one on the basis of a specific trait, without
sufficient justification.399
Second, girls and boys are more similar in elementary and
secondary education than they are different. This is evident in the
fact that "[a]nalyses of thousands of studies have found that
gender differences in cognitive and affective areas are actually
quite small."400 In fact, when one considers boys and girls as
separate groups, the differences within each of these groups "are
much, much larger than differences between girls as a group and
boys as a group."401 The data summarized in Part LA reveals that
girls' and boys' educational performances are similar and that the
gaps between them are closing in many areas. 402 In addition,
research also indicates that "[t]here are many boys who learn better
in the cooperative, relational styles commonly associated with girls,
and many girls who learn better in the competitive and individualistic style often associated with boys. "403 In light of strong evidence
that girls and boys are typically similarly situated in elementary
and secondary education, different treatment should be the
exception, rather than the norm.
399. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-91 (1973) (invalidating a statute that
treated similarly situated men and women differently); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)
("By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the
challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause."); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
211, at 635 ("Equal protection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a
similar manner."); Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B. U. L. Rev. 693,
710-11, 714 (2000).
400. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 36 (emphasis added); see also Campbell &
Wahl, supra note 159, at 306-07 ("In fact, however, girls and boys are more similar than they
are different. Researchers have known for many years that the differences among individual
boys and among individual girls are far greater than any average differences between girls
and boys." (footnote omitted)).
401. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 36 (emphasis added); see BARNETT & RIVERS,
supra note 353, at 222 ("Boys often differ more from one another in their temperaments and
styles of play, than they do from girls.").
402. See supra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
403. Campbell & Sanders, supra note 80, at 37 (citation omitted).
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This leads to the important question of when a school district
should be permitted to provide a solitary single-sex school. This
Article proposes that if a district can establish that persuasive
educational research shows that the sex excluded from a single-sex
school would not benefit from the educational opportunities in a
single-sex setting, the district would have established an exceedingly persuasive justification for denying a single-sex school to one
sex. 404 Such research could include consistent evidence, rather than
a single study, that a single-sex environment disadvantages one
sex, as some have contended is the case for boys. 405 However, the
district should still be required to provide the excluded sex those
educational opportunities beyond the single-sex setting that are
provided to the included sex. This would limit the denial of benefits
to the opportunity to receive these benefits in a single-sex setting,
rather than the totality of the benefits.
Such a narrow avenue for different single-sex opportunities is
consistent with the Court's opinion in Virginia, which implicitly
suggested that when an educational opportunity is "inherently
unsuitable" for one sex406-that is, that sex would not benefit from
the opportunity-a persuasive case might be made for denying such
an opportunity. As the number of single-sex schools continues to
grow in the United States, ongoing experience in single-sex schools
may develop a body of research that suggests that single-sex schools
that focus on a particular subject area or methodology do not benefit
one sex. If such research develops in the future, school districts
should not be forced to provide a particular type of single-sex school
to a sex that would not benefit from that specialized school. In the
interim, if the existing solitary schools have not developed such
research, they lack a sufficient justification for denying a substantially equal single-sex school to the excluded sex.
Finally, in addition to having a possible justification based on
research demonstrating that one sex will not benefit from the
single-sex opportunities, a school district that seeks to remedy past
404. Cf Cerven, supra note 203, at 726 (arguing that some single-sex schools for girls "do
not present evidence that boys would not similarly benefit from a school of their own with
small classes and individualized attention" and that "failing to offer boys the benefit of this
unique educational format appears to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment").
405. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
406. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 541 (1996).
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or present discrimination against one sex would have a sufficient
justification for denying a single-sex school to one sex. 407 Thus,
single-sex schools for girls typically enjoy a potential justification
that single-sex schools for boys do not-that is, those who operate
such schools should be permitted to demonstrate that this country's
history of sex discrimination against women and girls adversely
affects the classroom experience of girls in schools today. However,
educators should be required to identify within their district
sufficient probative evidence of the discrimination that they seek to
rectify, rather than assuming that past discrimination is influencing
their classrooms. 408 Furthermore, to rely on this justification,
educators must also demonstrate that this remedial justification
actually motivated them either in starting the school or in maintaining the school as a single-sex school. 409

4. Different Levels of Deference to the Judgments of Educators
Should Be Applied to Each Category of Single-Sex Schools
When applying these modifications to the substantial relationship
test to dual, voluntary schools and to solitary or involuntary schools,
a court must decide when it should defer to educational judgments
regarding single-sex schools. Several scholars have argued that
courts should defer to the decisions oflocal educators to offer singlesex schools, and thus, generally should not interfere with efforts to
provide such opportunities. 410 The Supreme Court has long recognized that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition."411 To uphold this autonomy, the Court often defers to the
judgments of educators because educators are better equipped to
make educational decisions than federal judges, who typically lack
the expertise to make such decisions. 412
407. See Corcoran, supra note 114, at 1032.
408. See Eng'g Contractors Ass'n ofS. Fla. Inc. v. Metro. Dade County, 122 F.3d 895, 91011 (11th Cir. 1997).
409. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
410. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 17, at 832, 848-49; Morgan, supra note 1, at 423; Kolb,
supra note 206, at 398-400.
411. Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1977); see Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583 (1987) ("States and local school boards are generally afforded considerable
discretion in operating public schools.").
412. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985).
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Although deference to the judgments of educators may be
appropriate in some circumstances, the Supreme Court's opinions
lack adequate guidance for equal protection cases regarding when
it should defer to the judgments of educators and when it should
reject them. For example, the Court in Virginia, in no uncertain
terms, chastised the Fourth Circuit for reviewing the VWIL plan
under a deferential analysis by stating that "[t]he Fourth Circuit
plainly erred in exposing Virginia's VWIL plan to a deferential
analysis, for all 'gender-based classifications today' warrant
'heightened scrutiny.'"413 The Court was also critical of the district
court's reliance on "'findings' on 'gender-based developmental
differences'" that "restate the opinions of Virginia's expert witnesses, opinions about typically male or typically female 'tendencies.'"414 The Court rejected these findings, noting that it had
previously cautioned lower courts to examine statements closely
regarding the tendencies of women and men, such as those proffered
by Virginia and accepted by the district court. 415 The Court's
unequivocal rejection of these findings reveals that deference to
educational judgments may not always be consistent with protecting
the equal protection rights of those who may not fall within the
typical paradigm for their sex, but who nevertheless must receive
the same protection of their right to be treated as an individual.
The strong rebuke of the Fourth Circuit in Virginia and the lack
of deference to VMI's judgments stands in sharp contrast to the
deference the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger gave to the University of
Michigan Law School's "educational judgment that ... diversity is
essential to its educational mission."416 The Court applied strict
scrutiny in Grutter, 417 an even more demanding standard than
intermediate scrutiny; nevertheless, the Court deferred to the law
school's judgment and explained that deference is consistent with its
practice of deferring to the academic decisions of university officials,

413.
414.
1991)).
415.
416.
417.

United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (emphasis added).

Id. at 541 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1434-45 (W.D. Va.
See id.

539 u.s. 306, 328 (2003).

Id. at 326-27.
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as long as those decisions are consistent with constitutional
guarantees. 418
Both the Virginia and Grutter decisions evaluate educational
judgments of university officials, which traditionally have "a special
niche in our constitutional tradition" because of the important goals
of public education and the extensive rights to freedom of speech
and thought at the postsecondary level. 419 However, the Court's
deference to educational judgments has also extended to the
elementary and secondary level. 420 Other courts reviewing such
decisions will likely remain confused about when it is appropriate
to defer to the judgments of educators under the Equal Protection
Clause, as the Court did in Grutter v. Bollinger, and when to reject
educational judgments, as the Court did in Virginia. Surely, the
deference cannot tum on whether an individual's constitutional
rights were violated, because the degree of deference will often be
determinative of that question.
A comprehensive development of how courts have and should
determine when deference to educational judgments is appropriate
is beyond the scope of this Article. 421 In applying this Article's
proposal, the degree of deference should vary according to the
structure of the single-sex schools. Considerable deference should be
given to the decision of a school district to offer dual, voluntary
single-sex schools because these schools are less likely to harm
either sex, and the structure of such schools achieves some of the
work of intermediate scrutiny. Deference is also appropriate in such
circumstances because single-sex education has received continuing
support as an appropriate pedagogical approach, 422 and the school
district is not requiring that any child be classified on the basis of
sex. Instead, the student or parent volunteers to be classified based
418. See id. at 328.
419. Id. at 329.
420. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985).
421. For possible approaches, see Ryan, supra note 325, at 1426, which contends that the
Supreme Court's approach to determining when courts should defer to school officials requires
a court "to identify the core, universal function of schools, and to use this function as a guide
to determine the circumstances in which schools will be granted deference," and Anne P.
Dupre, Disability, Deference, and the Integrity of the Academic Enterprise, 32 GA. L. REV. 393,
471-72 (1998), which proposes a model for an appropriate level of judicial deference for
educational decisions.
422. See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
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on the student's sex. The opportunity to attend substantially equal
single-sex schools on a voluntary basis provides greater assurance
that the "school district has demonstrated its commitment to a
course of action that gives full respect to the equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution. "423 Therefore, judicial deference to
such decisions will provide adequate flexibility for beneficial
educational programs, while still providing sufficient oversight to
uncover harmful stereotyping.
In contrast, less deference should be given to educational
judgments when the school district denies one sex the opportunity
to attend a single-sex school or when attendance at a single-sex
school is involuntary. Deference is less appropriate for solitary
schools because the denial of a benefit to one sex is more likely to be
based on the types of overly broad generalizations that the Court
has found unconstitutional in other sex discrimination cases. 424
Similarly, an involuntary sex classification runs a higher risk that
the classification will not serve its purpose in some instances than
a voluntary classification that may be avoided by the student or
parents. Therefore, less deference for involuntary single-sex schools
is appropriate.
In conclusion, Part V explores how adopting this proposed
modification to intermediate scrutiny will result in optimal results
for single-sex public schools.
V. MODIFYING AND SYSTEMATIZING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY TO
ACHIEVE OPTIMAL RESULTS FOR PuBLIC SINGLE-SEX ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS

Single-sex public elementary and secondary schools currently
exist in over one-third of the states. 425 Increased flexibility at the
federal level for single-sex public schools and the growing interest
in single-sex education create conditions in which single~sex public
schools will increasingly become more common in the United
423. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467,490 (1992).
424. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
425. See Minow, supra note 1, at 818. A tally of the states with single-sex schools listed on
the NASSPE website indicates that eighteen states have single-sex public schools. See
NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5.
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States. 426 In light ofthe growing number of single-sex schools, it is
important for educators and the Supreme Court to have clear and
consistent constitutional standards with which to evaluate these
schools. 427
Clear standards are presently lacking because the Court's
intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence is subject to a variety of
disparate interpretations that could be interpreted too restrictively
or too permissively to ensure the best possible results for single-sex
public schools. 428 A very restrictive interpretation would stifle the
development of single-sex schools, while a permissive standard
could allow educators to favor the needs of one sex over the other.
Scholars have also not provided effective proposals that would
ensure that school districts appropriately address the educational
needs of both sexes, while ending the confusion in the Supreme
Court's case law.
This Article's proposal seeks to address these concerns by
modifying and systematizing intermediate scrutiny when applied to
single-sex public schools, thereby providing clear guidance on the
constitutional obligations of these schools. 429 By systematizing
intermediate scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools, its
current indeterminacy is minimized. The increased consistency is
desirable because, as Cass Sunstein perceptively observes, "[t]he
Chancellor's foot is not a promising basis for antidiscrimination
law. "430 The proposal's clarity and consistency should place intermediate scrutiny's application to single-sex public schools within
clear parameters that are more characteristic of the rule of law. As
a result, courts are more likely to reach similar conclusions in
426. See Minow, supra note 1, at 830-31; Michael A. Fletcher, Single·Sex Education Gets
Boost, WASH. POST, May 9, 2002, at Al.
427. See Minow, supra note 1, at 816 ("The topic of some urgency is single·sex education
in kindergarten through high school .... For we are in the midst of a not-so-explicit policy shift:
now is the time to raise attention and honestly assess it.").
428. See supra 243-59 and accompanying text.
429. See Brake, supra note 257, at 14 (arguing that "we need a constitutional standard that
is clear for the lower courts").
430. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 78; see NOWAK& ROTUNDA, supra note 211, at 834 (arguing
that intermediate scrutiny is no more than "ad hoc judgments based upon Justices'
perceptions of the gender classification at issue in each case"); Deutsch, supra note 175, at 188
(arguing that the results in intermediate scrutiny cases "turn on how the Court and the
individual Justices view the underlying facts and policies, rather than on the verbalization
of the standard of review").
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assessing such schools, thereby preventing the variation of equal
protection rights from school district to school district and from
state to state.
In contrast to other proposals, this Article's proposal recognizes
that the structure of single-sex schools affects the need for judicial
skepticism of single-sex schools. ·More skepticism and a higher
constitutional hurdle are appropriate when a school district provides
a solitary or involuntary school because such schools increase the
risk ofharm to students. The proposed modifications thereby ensure
that the greatest scrutiny is applied when a school district is more
likely to be denying the equal protection rights of schoolchildren by
treating girls and boys differently or by forcing an individual to be
classified on the basis of sex. In contrast, when a school district
provides dual, voluntary schools, schoolchildren who want to avoid
the sex classification have the option to do so. In modifying the level
of judicial skepticism based on the structure of single-sex schools,
this Article's proposal achieves some of the same benefits of the
Court's three-tiered approach to equal protection that tries "to
ensure that courts are most skeptical in cases in which it is highly
predictable that illegitimate motives are at work."431
By also requiring districts to examine how they structure singlesex schools, the proposal ensures that a school district will develop
such schools based on evidence about the current educational
problems, needs, and barriers that educators are attempting to
address, and about how educators can best address those needs
through single-sex schools. 432 Under the proposal, districts that
consider offering single-sex schools must examine whether both
sexes will benefit from single-sex schools and must establish an
exceedingly persuasive justification for not offering substantially
equal single-sex schools to both sexes. This ensures that the
constitutional requirements for such schools do not permit disparate treatment of girls and boys, absent a persuasive justification
for that treatment because girls and boys are typically similarly
situated with respect to educational matters. Currently, a substan431. Sunstein, supra note 15, at 78.
432. See Wexler, supra note 247, at 334 (arguing that intermediate scrutiny forces
legislators to examine the justifications for adopting a certain justification and to consider
whether and how well the proposed solution will work).
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tial percentage of the single-sex schools do not provide similar
opportunities to both sexes;433 however, whether these districts have
a sufficiently persuasive reason for denying a single-sex school to
·
only one sex remains to be seen.
Adoption of this proposal by the courts would put educators on
notice that a solitary or involuntary single-sex school must have a
much tighter nexus between the ends and means adopted, and be
more effective than other sex-neutral alternatives. On the other
hand, the more permissive interpretation of intermediate scrutiny's
substantial relationship test for dual, voluntary schools allows
educators to develop substantially equal single-sex schools for both
sexes with less fear of such schools being found unconstitutional.
When assessing the constitutionality of dual, voluntary schools, the
proposal in this Article also avoids applying an unnecessarily heavy
presumption in favor of coeducational schools, in light of evidence
that coeducation does not necessarily prevent the subjugation of
either sex. 434
This Article's proposal is designed to minimize any obstacles to its
adoption by the Supreme Court by drawing on existing Supreme
Court jurisprudence when appropriate. Thus, it builds on the
Court's recent modification of its equal protection jurisprudence in
Grutter v. Bollinger, which implicitly recognized the appropriateness
of modifying a constitutional standard when the classification under
review demands a deviation from past standards to reach optimal
results. When appropriate, the proposal is also consistent with
United States v. Virginia, while recognizing that "Virginia left
important questions unanswered. "435 For example, the Court noted
in Virginia that "[s]everal amici [had] urged that diversity in
educational opportunities is an altogether appropriate governmental
pursuit and that single-sex schools can contribute importantly to
such diversity. "436 The Court responded that it does "not question the
Commonwealth's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse
educational opportunities. "437 The later statement may indicate that
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

See supra notes 121, 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 268-76 and accompanying text.
See Morgan, supra note 1, at 458.
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515,534 n.7 (1996).
ld. (emphasis added).
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the Court will view the separate distribution of substantially equal
educational benefits in single-sex schools for both boys and girls
with much less skepticism than it viewed Virginia's denial of
educational opportunities to females.
In contrast, the Court's demanding interpretation of the intermediate scrutiny test in Virginia also reveals that the Court will look
with tremendous skepticism upon disparities in single-sex educational opportunities, and that the same skepticism and demanding
interpretation of the substantial relationship test present in
Virginia will and should be required in a case in which a single-sex
school is denied to only one sex. 438 A school district's provision of a
single-sex school to address an educational need would not be
substantially related to addressing that need if it failed to meet the
needs of students of the other sex who are similarly situated-that
is, if their needs also would be met in a single-sex school. 439
However, this Article's proposal would not apply this demanding
interpretation of the substantial relationship test to all single-sex
public schools because that would undoubtedly deter educators from
opening such schools.
This Article's proposal also seeks to strike the proper allocation
of constitutional responsibility between educators, who have the
greatest expertise in making educational judgments, and judges,
who have more expertise in determining when disparate treatment
is unwarranted. By allowing greater constitutional latitude for dual,
voluntary single-sex schools, the proposal recognizes that courts
may lack sufficient competence to second guess the judgment of
educators that such educational opportunities are beneficial and
thus, the courts will share with educators and families the responsibility for protecting the constitutional rights of schoolchildren. 440 In
438. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 545-46.
439. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) ("Congress may not legislate 'one step
at a time' when that step is drawn along the line of gender, and the consequence is to exclude
one group of families altogether from badly needed subsistence benefits.").
440. By encouraging educators and courts to share responsibility for protecting the rights
of schoolchildren, the proposal in this Article incorporates the wisdom of Richard Fallon who
argued that
the Court must assess the competence of courts to conduct particular kinds of
inquiries; the costs that particular tests are likely to engender ... ; and the
political fairness of having courts resolve different kinds of questions on more
or less deferential bases in the face of reasonable disagreements among the
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contrast, when a school district provides an involuntary or solitary
single-sex school, the application of a demanding standard focuses
the courts' attention on the likelihood that educators may not be
treating similarly situated students in a similar manner. The
application of the more demanding standard does not prohibit all
efforts to provide distinct educational opportunities to boys and
girls; instead, it merely requires educators to provide exceedingly
persuasive justifications for why they are not providing similar
single-sex opportunities for boys and girls who are similarly
situated. 44J While judiciaries lack the educational expertise to
overrule the judgment of some educators that single-sex schools
benefit students, courts can and should closely scrutinize cases in
which school districts offer disparate opportunities to similarly
situated girls and boys.
Ultimately, the foundation for this Article's proposal rests on
several principles regarding the nature of equal protection. It
embraces the theory that govemment should have greater latitude
to permit citizens to recognize their sex-when they believe that it
may benefit them-than govemment should have to deny citizens
benefits or opportunities on the basis of sex or to classify citizens on
an involuntary basis. 442 In addition, neither courts nor educators
should casually stray from the bedrock principle that the govem-

citizenry ....
When judicial competence is lacking or the costs of particular forms of judicial
involvement would be great, the Court does not necessarily betray its obligation
of constitutional fidelity if it fails to craft judicially enforceable rules that fully
protect constitutional norms. The Court can share responsibility for
implementing the Constitution with other institutions. Conversely, when
judicial enforcement seems practically necessary, and a bright-line prophylactic
rule will work most effectively at relatively low cost, not every doctrine that
"over-enforces" constitutional norms reflects a constitutional betrayal.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 66 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
441. See supra notes 386, 399-406 and accompanying text.
442. Martha Minow has observed that "[e)specially when used by decisionmakers who
award benefits and distribute burdens, traits of difference can carry meanings uncontrolled
and unwelcomed by those to who they are assigned. Yet denying those differences undermines
the value they may have to those who cherish them as part of their own identity." Martha
Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARv. L. REV.
10, 12 (1987).
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ment must treat citizens as equals,443 even as society tries to remedy
those instances in which equality has been historically denied. At
bottom, the proposal wisely fears any potential danger from offering
similar, voluntary opportunities for single-sex schools for girls and
boys far less than it fears disparate or involuntary single-sex
opportunities. 444 Society is collectively harmed when a girl or a boy
is denied an opportunity from which she or he would benefit simply
because of her or his sex. "[I]nequalities prevent people from
developing their potentials and hence deprive society of innumerable benefits."445 Greater constitutional latitude for equal treatment
recognizes that "the entire society is affected by the educational
opportunities and achievements of each new generation, and that no
one can be wasted. oo446
Undoubtedly, no approach to determining the constitutionality of
single-sex public schools will achieve perfect outcomes. This Article's
approach is no exception because it will prohibit some single-sex
public schools that would benefit some students. However, on
balance, the approach achieves superior results compared to the
two principal scholarly approaches and the variety of disparate
approaches that can be drawn from the Supreme Court's current
intermediate scrutiny jurisprudence. The proposal also raises some
questions of its own, such as whether the modifications could be
applied to other sex classifications. Those questions do not undermine the fact that the proposed modifications are a substantial step
toward clarifying a vague and indeterminate standard.
By allowing some room within the Constitution's confines for
single-sex schools, this Article agrees with those who contend that
what was once used to subjugate women may be used to empower
them. 447 This country's history of sex discrimination, including the
operation of single-sex and coeducational schools that focused on
443. See TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1437-38 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause
requires the government to treat similarly those who are similarly situated and to
acknowledge relevant distinctions when persons are differently situated).
444. Erwin Chemerinsky has observed that "human experience strongly suggests that the
danger oferroneous discrimination incomparably exceeds the danger of erroneous uniformity."
Chemerinsky, supra note 261, at 590.
445. Id. at 587.
446. Martha Minow, Reforming School Reform, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 257, 282 (1999).
447. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 459.
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preparing girls for marriage, motherhood, or poorly paid positions,
should not prevent the citizenry or a state actor from acknowledging
sex when that acknowledgment may enable individuals to achieve
their full potential. 448 While some argue that single-sex schools for
girls will always be inferior, some of the newest single-sex schools
for girls have achieved remarkable results in urban areas where
educators have struggled for years to improve outcomes. 449 When
these schools increase the graduation rates for girls, improve
their academic performance, and focus their attention on their
professional goals, rather than their popularity with boys, these
schools can empower, rather than subjugate, girls and women. The
shackles of the country's history with single-sex schools should not
limit the opportunities for those girls or boys who would benefit
from single-sex education today. 450 The modifications proposed in
this Article permit educators to develop single-sex schools among
the array of public school choice reforms, while maintaining a
commitment to equality. 451
The country should neither water down constitutional obligations
in the name of improving educational outcomes, nor erect an
impenetrable barrier in the way of efforts to improve educational
achievement. Equal protection seeks to ensure that the government
"treat[s] each individual with equal regard as a person,""52 which
requires the government to treat similarly those who are similarly
situated and to acknowledge relevant distinctions when persons are
differently situated. The proposal presented in this Article would
provide the optimal protection for students' equal protection rights
by focusing scrutiny on solitary or involuntary single-sex schools
and limiting scrutiny of dual, voluntary single-sex schools. If
educators develop public single-sex elementary and secondary
schools, they should act with a clear understanding of their
448. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) ("Sex classifications may
be used ... to advance full development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.").
449. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
450. Cf Minow, supra note 446, at 288 ("What if school choice reforms afforded the occasion
for building on the past while undertaking bold experiments. What if we recognized, as Audre
Lorde put it, that '[w)e have the power those who came before us have given us, to move
beyond the place where they were standing."' (alteration in original)).
451. See id. at 280 (noting that some new reforms "could undermine equality goals unless
there are direct efforts to maintain and enforce them").
452. TRIBE, supra note 234, at 1437-38.
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constitutional obligations. This understanding should encourage
educators to develop beneficial educational programs and prevent
the country from straying from its commitment to equal educational
opportunity as public single-sex elementary and secondary schools
continue to open. 453

453. See NASSPE, Schools, supra note 5 (identifying four single-sex schools that may open
in 2006).

